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ARTICLES
“HOT NEWS”:  THE ENDURING MYTH OF PROPERTY
IN NEWS
Shyamkrishna Balganesh*
The “hot news” doctrine refers to a cause of action for the misappropria-
tion of time-sensitive factual information that state laws afford purveyors of
news against free riding by a direct competitor.  Entirely the offshoot of the
Supreme Court’s decision in International News Service v. Associated
Press, the doctrine enables an information gatherer to prevent a competitor
from free riding on its efforts at collecting and distributing timely informa-
tion.  Over the last few years, newsgatherers of different kinds have begun
using the doctrine with increased frequency, believing it to create and protect
an ownership interest in news.  This Article argues that this belief misappre-
hends the real basis for the hot news doctrine and its unique analytical struc-
ture.  Originating in the synthesis of two different areas of the common law,
unfair competition and unjust enrichment, hot news is concerned principally
with solving a collective action problem in the market for newsgathering.
Given the enormous expenditures that newsgathering entails, its sus-
tainability as a practice depends on newspapers cooperating with each other
in different ways.  In recognition of this, hot news operates as a mechanism
by which to preserve the incentives of individual competitors to enter into
cooperative newsgathering and sharing arrangements that raise their indi-
vidual and collective profitability, while simultaneously maintaining the
common pool (i.e., public domain) nature of factual news.  It thus attempts
to maintain a competitive equilibrium among newsgatherers through a gain-
based liability framework and, in the process, emphasizes a very different
distributive baseline from that inherent in the idea of property in news.  Ap-
preciating this difference and its significance is crucial to the doctrine’s con-
tinuing survival and sheds light on its inherent unsuitability as a new
source of revenue for the newspaper industry.
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INTRODUCTION
The modern newspaper industry is in a state of crisis.1  In the last
three years alone, its advertising revenues have shrunk by over 43%.2  Be-
tween 1990 and 2008, the number of daily newspapers in the country
dropped by 12.6%.3  However, almost immediately, newspapers pointed
to what they believed was the principal source of their financial
problems—the growth of the Internet, and with it the emergence of news
aggregators, bloggers, and other “parasitic” distribution mechanisms that
relay the substance of their news stories to readers around the world with-
out compensating them for their efforts.  The solution to the problem
was obvious to newspapers:  greater intellectual property protection.4
What newspapers sought was thus a regime that propertized the news
once collected, by converting it into an artificially scarce resource, which
could in turn be licensed to online entities for an additional source of
revenue.5  Copyright law would be of limited assistance here, since it con-
sciously excludes facts from the scope of its coverage, and newspapers’
principal concern was with entities that communicate the bare facts of a
news story to audiences via the Internet.6  They sought their answer in-
stead in an early twentieth-century doctrine that had been developed by
the Supreme Court exclusively for the newspaper industry:  the common
law doctrine of “hot news” misappropriation.  Resurrecting this doctrine,
1. See Philip Meyer, The Vanishing Newspaper:  Saving Journalism in the Information
Age 5 (2d ed. 2009) (noting decline of newspaper influence, profitability, and household
penetration); Frank Ahrens, The Accelerating Decline of Newspapers, Wash. Post, Oct. 27,
2009, at A15 (describing how today’s newspaper circulation numbers are lowest in history);
Eric Alterman, Out of Print:  The Death and Life of the American Newspaper, New Yorker,
Mar. 31, 2008, at 48, 48–49 (discussing how newspapers in their current printed form are
unlikely to survive).
2. Newspaper Ass’n of Am., Advertising Expenditures, at http://www.naa.org/
TrendsandNumbers/Advertising-Expenditures.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last updated Mar. 2010).
3. Pew Research Ctr., Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News
Media 2010, Number of U.S. Daily Newspapers:  Weekday and Sunday Editions, Yearly
Increments, 1990–2008, at http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/chartland.php?msg=1&
id=1312&ct=line&dir=&sort=&c1=1&c2=1&c3=1&c4=1&c5=0&c6=0&c7=0&c8=0&c9=0&
c10=0&d3=0&dd3=1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
4. See generally Steven Petersen & Ryan Sidlik, The Associated Press Intellectual
Prop. Initiative (2009), available at http://www.bivings.com/thelab/presentations/
AP_Intellectual_Property_Bivings.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
Associated Press initiative to “crack down on sites that it claims use its intellectual property
improperly”).
5. See Associated Press, Protect, Point, Pay—An Associated Press Plan for Reclaiming
News Content Online, available at http://www.niemanlab.org/pdfs/ProtectPointPay.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) (describing licensing
market at heart of this idea).
6. See Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–48 (1991)
(observing how mere facts are excluded from copyright law, absent original expression).
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they now believed, would provide them with a badly needed ownership
interest in the news.7
The story of hot news begins with International News Service v.
Associated Press.8  In a largely concocted dispute between two rival news
cooperatives, the Court was presented with an opportunity to recognize a
time-bound property right in news.9  Instead of taking the bait and hav-
ing to decide between a full-blown property right in news or no protec-
tion at all, the majority chose to steer a middle path and in the process
articulated a framework that has since remained as novel as it was contro-
versial.  This was the quasi-property doctrine of misappropriation.  The
Court consciously rejected the idea of a property right in news, expres-
sing concern over the public interest consequences of such a move, and
decided to frame its opinion in terms of unfair competition.10  Starting
from the proposition that it was objectionable to reap without sowing, it
went on to recognize that a newsgatherer could bring an action against a
competitor for free riding on its efforts when the news in question was
time sensitive, and therefore of commercial value.11
By moving the debate away from property and toward a liability
framework, the Court seemed to deny the newspaper industry a tradable
ex ante entitlement in news.  Yet, its framework for this move seemed to
sit rather oddly with common law ideas and thinking at the time.  Justice
Brandeis, in a strongly worded dissent in the case, thought the majority to
be masking its propertarian logic in nonproprietary terms and attempted
to call the majority’s bluff.12  The Court’s novel category of quasi-
property was also met with little support, and eventually came to be char-
acterized as largely meaningless.13  These developments, coupled with
the demise of federal general common law,14 resulted in the misappropri-
ation doctrine falling into desuetude.  In due course, however, several
state common law jurisdictions absorbed it into their unfair competition
laws.15  Of these, New York’s hot news doctrine has since become the
most prominent, owing to the Second Circuit’s conscious decision to
7. See Owning the News:  Copyrighting Facts as Well as Words, Economist, June 26,
2010, at 63 (discussing proposed heightened protections for newspapers and potential
impact on ability to copyright facts).
8. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
9. See generally Douglas G. Baird, The Story of INS v. AP:  Property, Natural
Monopoly, and the Uneasy Legacy of a Concocted Controversy, in Intellectual Property
Stories 9 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) [hereinafter Baird,
Uneasy Legacy] (discussing case background and ramifications).
10. International News, 248 U.S. at 236.
11. Id. at 239–40.
12. Id. at 258 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2002)
(describing quasi-property as a “term with little meaningful legal significance”).
14. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal
general common law.”).
15. See, e.g., Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 710–12
(2d Cir. 1982) (New York law); Bd. of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 439 N.E.2d 526, 537 (Ill.
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make sense of the Court’s opinion in International News, and the indus-
try’s increased reliance on it of late.
The hot news doctrine, as formulated by the Second Circuit, takes
the International News framework as its starting point and disaggregates it
into five independent factors for analysis.16  Under the doctrine, a plain-
tiff newsgatherer may recover from a defendant when:  (1) the new-
sgathering/collection involves a significant expenditure, (2) the news/
information is time sensitive, (3) the defendant free rides on the material
collected by the plaintiff, (4) such free riding competes directly with the
plaintiff’s own market, and (5) it is likely to diminish the incentive to
gather/collect the news in a timely manner.17
Despite its attempt to remain true to the original misappropriation
framework, the hot news variant that the Second Circuit formulated
deviates from the original framework in one crucial respect.  Whereas
International News had been conscious in avoiding the use of property and
ownership rhetoric to frame its analysis of misappropriation, the Second
Circuit’s attempted reformulation superimposed on the misappropria-
tion framework distinctively propertarian rhetoric.  Noting in no uncer-
tain terms that International News was “not about ethics” but “about the
protection of property rights,” the Second Circuit’s analysis seemed di-
rected entirely at establishing a primary market for newsgatherers to li-
cense their collections to competitors in traditional intellectual property
fashion.18  In effect, the decision reinvigorated the debate about property
in news. International News had, until this point, been taken to be more
about unfair competition and less about property rights.  The Second
Circuit’s logic seemed to unequivocally reverse this interpretation.
This distinction initially made little difference, even after the emer-
gence of the hot news doctrine, given the infrequency with which plain-
tiffs relied on it.  When the newspaper industry began looking for an in-
tellectual property solution to their problems, however, they readily
seized on the propertarian approach to misappropriation.
In early 2009, the Associated Press (AP) announced that it had de-
cided to invest heavily in efforts to prevent the misappropriation of its
news on the Internet, in the belief that it needed to receive “appropriate
compensation” for its newsgathering efforts, noting that it would not con-
tinue to rely on “misguided legal theories.”19  Later that year, the AP be-
gan to put together a digital news registry to tag and track every piece of
App. Ct. 1982) (Illinois law); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 341
A.2d 348, 353 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (New Jersey law).
16. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852–53 (2d Cir. 1997).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 853.  What is ironic in all of this is that the Second Circuit ultimately denied
the plaintiff’s claim.  Yet, its holding and analysis have spurred a robust body of case law,
especially in the Second Circuit.
19. Dean Singleton, Chairman, Associated Press, Remarks at the Associated Press
Annual Meeting (Apr. 6, 2009), at http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/
pr_040609c.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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news that the AP and its members publish, with the idea of charging com-
mercial and noncommercial distributors and users of its news a licensing
fee.20  Its efforts found encouragement in the successes it had in bringing
hot news actions against online news distributors who lifted facts from its
published news stories.21
Other news and information gathering entities have also begun to
invoke the hot news doctrine against online competitors, in the similar
belief that doing so will result in the creation of a robust licensing market
for their information services—in turn, an additional source of reve-
nue.22  Interestingly, it is not just the dominant or large industry incum-
bents who have begun to embark on this strategy.  Several new, smaller,
and principally online newsgatherers view the hot news doctrine as creat-
ing and protecting a full-blown, albeit temporally limited, property right
in their news.23  The effect of this has, in turn, been that courts interpret-
ing and applying the hot news doctrine have readily inferred the exis-
tence of an ownership norm among news collectors in applying the hot
news doctrine, without examining whether the norm has an independent
20. Press Release, Associated Press, Associated Press to Build News Registry to Protect
Content (July 23, 2009), available at http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/
pr_072309a.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  More recently, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a letter supporting AP’s actions, creating the registry,
and noting that it was unlikely to run afoul of the antitrust laws.  See Letter from Christine
A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., to William J. Baer,
Esq., Arnold & Porter LLP (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/busreview/257318.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he Department
has no present intention to challenge the AP’s Registry proposal . . . [as it] is not likely to
result in anticompetitive harm and . . . it may provide procompetitive benefits to
participating content owners and users.”).  Of course, the DOJ’s support says nothing of
AP’s position on the ownership of news.
21. See, e.g., Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458–61
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A cause of action for misappropriation of hot news remains viable under
New York law, and the Second Circuit has unambiguously held that it is not preempted by
federal law.”).
22. See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The [plaintiff financial services] firms contend that their
recommendations are ‘hot news’ and that the regular, systematic, and timely taking and
redistribution of their recommendations constitutes misappropriation . . . .”); Complaint
¶ 7, Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Briefing.com, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-03321 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010)
(“Briefing.com . . . unfairly competes with Dow Jones in the delivery of ‘hot news’ and
tortiously misappropriates Dow Jones’ headlines and articles from the DJN.”).
23. Theflyonthewall.com, a defendant in one of the cases previously cited, had in fact
commenced an action for hot news misappropriation against another small competitor,
Tradethenews.com, and settled the matter before a verdict.  See Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F.
Supp. 2d at 327–28 (explaining allegations as including misappropriation of “Fly’s
valuable, time-sensitive, proprietary information by broadcasting content from Fly’s
newsfeed on its own website within seconds of the content being posted”).  The court in
Barclays used the prior case to deny the defendant’s claim that there was a strong industry-
wide norm against owning news and information that was publicly distributed.  Id. at 338
(“Fly’s argument that its practices are in accordance with prevailing industry norms—that,
in essence, no one ‘owns’ financial information once it is released—is further undermined
by Fly’s use of the hot-news misappropriation theory to sue one of its competitors, TTN.”).
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basis, or indeed the possibility that incumbents’ mistaken reliance on the
hot news doctrine may have itself influenced the development of the
norm.  Property in news seems to be a de facto reality today under the hot
news doctrine.
The attempt to resurrect hot news misappropriation as a solution to
the problems faced by newspapers reached its culmination recently, when
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a discussion paper outlining
a few potential policy proposals aimed at reinventing journalism.24  Fea-
turing rather prominently in this policy paper was the enactment of
“Federal Hot News Legislation” to help address newspapers’ revenue
problems.25  Centered on the rhetoric of proprietary facts, the proposal
argues that federalizing the doctrine might provide newsgatherers with a
necessary financial incentive to invest in newsgathering.26  It is certainly
too early to say whether this proposal will ever move forward, but it un-
questionably points to recent developments having effectively resusci-
tated the hot news doctrine.27
This Article argues that these developments all rest on a flawed un-
derstanding of the misappropriation doctrine and its underlying theoreti-
cal basis.28  Contrary to the Second Circuit’s facial rhetoric and the news-
paper industry’s beliefs, the misappropriation doctrine (including its hot
24. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Potential Policy Recommendations to Support the
Reinvention of Journalism 5–17 (Discussion Draft 2010) [hereinafter FTC Discussion
Draft], available at www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/jun15/docs/new-staff-
discussion.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
25. Id. at 9–11.
26. Id. at 10.
27. For some criticisms of the FTC’s study in the newspaper media, see Jeremy W.
Peters, Government Takes on Journalism’s Next Chapter, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2010, at B7
(collecting criticisms of FTC paper from journalists, media watchdogs, and academics);
Editorial, FTC Floats Drudge Tax:  Journalism Can Reinvent Itself Without Government
‘Help,’ Wash. Times, June 4, 2010, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/
4/ftc-floats-drudge-tax/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The Federal Trade
Commission . . . is seeking ways to ‘reinvent’ journalism, and that’s a cause for concern.”).
For the most substantive response to the proposals to date, see Google, Inc., Comments on
Federal Trade Commission’s News Media Workshop and Staff Discussion Draft on
“Potential Policy Recommendations to Support the Reinvention of Journalism” 2 (2010),
available at www.google.com/googleblogs/pdfs/google_ftc_news_media_comments.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Regulatory proposals that undermine the
functioning of healthy marketplaces and stall the pace of change are not the solution.”).
28. References in this Article to “misappropriation” and “the misappropriation
doctrine” should be understood as referring to hot news misappropriation—i.e., the cause
of action that is traced back to International News and the unique quasi-property doctrine
that the Court formulated in that case.  The two terms are used interchangeably
throughout.  It very importantly does not include the more generic idea of
misappropriation, which extends beyond these situations and is often invoked in relation
to trade secrets, goodwill, and other intangibles.  See Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation:
A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 621, 626–41 (2003) (discussing misappropriation as stand-alone
doctrine that originated in International News); Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation
Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 875, 876
(1991) (referring to misappropriation as doctrine that originated in International News).
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news variant) is incapable of creating a property interest, even in tradi-
tional intellectual property form, in news.  While the doctrine is directed
at deterring free riding, it does so in the context of solving a collective
action problem that was and is unique to the newspaper industry, related
to the practice of cooperative newsgathering.
Newspapers competing in the market for time-sensitive news face a
problem.  Collecting news on a regular basis in systematic fashion in-
volves an enormous expenditure of skill and resources.  No single news-
paper can afford to do this by itself on a sustained basis.  Since factual
news is by its very nature homogeneous (rather than unique to its collec-
tor) and publicly accessible, newspapers are best off individually and col-
lectively when they cooperate and pool their resources and efforts to-
gether to collect news.  In this scenario, however, rampant free riding by
a few newspapers unwilling to cooperate (or to collect the news on their
own) is likely to diminish other newspapers’ willingness to cooperate,
thereby directly impacting the industry’s collective profitability.  Newspa-
pers are thus best off when they all cooperate, but free riding by one or a
few of them affects their incentives to do so.29
Newspapers recognized the need for cooperation amongst them-
selves very early on in their development, organizing themselves into for-
mal and informal collectives, and sharing journalistic leads and tips with
each other both within and outside these formations.30  While these for-
mations were at first sustained by informal norms against free riding, the
formalization of cooperative efforts necessitated the institutionalization
of these norms.  The misappropriation doctrine stepped in here, and
sought to raise the costs of free riding while simultaneously allowing co-
operative newsgathering and informational sharing among competitors
to continue.  Free riding thus was not problematic for its own sake, but
only because of its effects on the dynamics of the group.  An individual
property right granted to each news collector might deter free riding, but
could potentially affect the nature of cooperation in the market.31
Given the prevalence of cooperation and sharing among competing
newspapers in the market, a property right in the nature of a first-
possession-based exclusive entitlement in the news would likely have im-
posed a new set of transaction and information costs on newspapers, de-
terred cost-effective sharing of tips and leads, and possibly also resulted in
duplicative races among competitors to be the first to collect and report
the news.  The Court in International News seemed to recognize this as a
distinct possibility.  Intellectual property rights have, for a long time,
29. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing how free riding of some newspapers incentivizes
free riding by most participants in market, leading to slower collection and dissemination
of news).
30. See infra Part II.A.2.a–b (discussing evolution of formal and informal types of
cooperation among newspapers).
31. See infra Part II.A.2.c (describing problems that arise from granting individual
property right in news).
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been thought to be the law’s most obvious response to the problem of
informational free riding.32  Their grant of exclusivity over the intangible
enables the limited internalization of positive externalities by rights hold-
ers, thereby inducing the very production of the intangible.  Structurally
though, such individual exclusion rights make the most sense only when
the intangible is individually produced by, and therefore in some sense
unique to, the right holder.  When the intangible in question is not in
any way unique to its purveyor, but rather produced through a collective
effort, the harm from free riding lies instead in its entrenching a collec-
tive action problem.  Deterring such free riding through a liability mecha-
nism without simultaneously attaching the entitlement to the intangible,
by focusing, as a normative matter, on the unfair gain to the defendant
rather than on the loss to the plaintiffs, offers a more tailored, equally
effective, and less problematic solution than a property mechanism.
Keeping this in mind, the framework that the Court chose instead of
a property right was one of unjust enrichment, from which it created a
regime of gain-based liability for the unauthorized, competitive use of the
news collected by an individual or group of newspapers.  Without con-
verting the news collected into an artificially scarce resource, a free rider
is held liable for the expenditure that it saves by free riding instead of
collecting or cooperating.33  It is in this crucial respect that the misappro-
priation doctrine differs from the idea of property in news—by only al-
lowing for the incomplete or partial internalization of externalities.
Misappropriation is thus a framework for recovery that draws on un-
fair competition and unjust enrichment law, an interface that has other-
wise received little scholarly attention.34  As a body of court-developed
rules, unfair competition uses ideas from different parts of the common
32. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L.
Rev. 1031, 1033–46 (2005) (“Courts applying the property theory of intellectual property
are seeking out and eliminating uses of a right they perceive to be free riding.”).
33. See infra Part II.B (discussing interrelationship between unjust enrichment
principle and misappropriation doctrine).
34. Perhaps the only scholar to recognize this connection early on was Rudolf
Callmann.  See Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown:  Unjust
Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 595, 596–97 (1942)
(noting that INS v. AP “in effect imported into the law of unfair competition the concept
of unjust enrichment”).  Yet, Callmann’s analysis paid scant attention to the nuances of
unjust enrichment doctrine and its structural contribution to the debate about
misappropriation, focusing almost entirely on unfair competition, Callmann’s principal
area of interest at the time.  Nearly half a century later, Wendy Gordon’s work on
intellectual property’s “restitutionary impulse” also examined this interface in some detail.
See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:  Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 244 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, Restitutionary
Impulse] (“[T]he restitutionary cause of action is a species of unfair competition; this
competition is deemed unfair because the law recognizes the restitutionary principle.  This
relationship between the two doctrinal categories should not be surprising.  After all . . .
International News Service . . . is a case of both unfair competition and unjust
enrichment.”).  For a recent discussion of unjust enrichment law in the European context,
see Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Unfair Competition Law:  The Protection of Intellectual
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law to create private causes of action for behavior that is likely to harm
competition in the market.35  It closely resembles antitrust law in many
respects, except that its origins are often independent of any statute, and
therefore largely a matter of state and federal common law.  The law of
unjust enrichment is premised on the idea that there exist circumstances
where a plaintiff can recover from a defendant when the latter is en-
riched at the expense of the former, without there having to be any
wrongdoing, loss, or bargain between the parties.36  In other words, it
forms a fourth “wheel” of the common law alongside tort, contract, and
property law.37  Much like property law, the law of unjust enrichment
deals with the allocation of positive externalities that intentionally or un-
intentionally arise and flow to strangers.38  Yet, their similarity ends there.
Whereas property law recognizes an ex ante, nonrelational interest in an
owner (i.e., the ownership interest) and makes it the normative baseline
around which actions are structured, the principle of unjust enrichment
recognizes no such similar interest.  Instead, it operates entirely as a prin-
ciple of distributive justice that derives its normative basis in the incom-
patibility of the resulting situation with certain ideals of social morality.
and Industrial Creativity 121–34 (1997) (examining unjust enrichment doctrine in
Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).
35. For early work trying to describe the area, see Charles Bunn, The National Law of
Unfair Competition, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 987, 987–88 (1949) (“[W]e have a national law of
unfair competition now.  It is found in . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, as
amended by the Act of 1938.”); Rudolf Callmann, What is Unfair Competition?, 28 Geo.
L.J. 585, 607 (1940) [hereinafter Callmann, What is Unfair?] (“Only if we free the life of
commercial competition from the role of a Cinderella . . . may the Law of Competition
develop freely and without restraint.”); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53
Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1315 (1940) (explaining his theory of “Exploration” in which courts
cautiously expand concept of unfair competition to include “a few new kinds of
standardized wrongs”); Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175, 259
(1936) (“[T]he definition of unfair competition by administrative legislation is
incomparably superior to definition by administrative decision.”); James Angell
McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 274, 274 (1936)
(“Judicial development of [unfair competition] into closely related fields has been
needlessly restricted by two leading cases.”); Ervin H. Pollack, A Projection for the
Revaluation of Unfair Competition, 13 Ohio St. L.J. 187, 235 (1952) (“The pattern of
legislative, judicial and administrative experience has been sufficiently outlined to sketch a
clear legislative picture of unfair competition but its details must be completed by
administrative action.”).
36. See generally Hanoch Dagan, Unjust Enrichment:  A Study of Private Law and
Public Values 1–3 (1997) (noting components of unjust enrichment include “(i) a benefit
(or enrichment); (ii) which has been received by the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense; and
(iii) the retention of which is unjust”); Christopher T. Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary
Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 Emory L.J. 153, 155, 191–219 (1996) (discussing four
distinct principles underlying liability based on unjust enrichment).
37. Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1369,
1370–71 (1994) (“[T]he common law coach runs not on three substantive wheels, but on
four.”).
38. See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods:  Liability for Unrequested
Benefits, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 189, 190 (2009) (describing unjust enrichment law in terms of
externalities).
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In other words, it is almost always backward looking, and operates ex
post.
The doctrinal apparatus of hot news misappropriation bears the in-
delible imprint of the instrumental goals that motivated its creation.
Most of the doctrine’s elements remain meaningful only when under-
stood within the broader context of what it was trying to achieve.  The
incentives needed for cooperative newsgathering, the practice that misap-
propriation was directed at preserving, remain quite different from those
demanded by newspapers in the digital environment.  Disconnecting mis-
appropriation from its roots in cooperative newsgathering in order to
serve this alternative purpose would necessitate jettisoning key elements
of the doctrine and converting it into a property interest.  This is, in turn,
likely to raise serious federal preemption and First Amendment concerns,
thereby calling into question its very utility and survival.  If hot news mis-
appropriation is to survive as a viable doctrine, then rooting it in a theory
of competitive unjust enrichment directed at solving a collective action
problem seems unavoidable.  Understanding that theory and its continu-
ing relevance for newsgathering, appreciating how it differs from the
traditional rationale for intellectual property, and analyzing the practical
consequences that flow from it are but logical first steps in that endeavor.
Hot news misappropriation did not and cannot create a property right in
news.  Efforts to reinvigorate newspaper journalism ought to look else-
where for answers.
This Article offers a positive theory of the misappropriation doctrine
independent of property and ownership, and attempts to thereby dispel
the belief that it did create, or is indeed capable of creating, an owner-
ship interest in news.  It explains the dynamics of competitive newsgather-
ing and shows how the doctrine uses the connection between unjust en-
richment and unfair competition to encourage cooperative efforts in that
market.  Part I provides an overview of the property-based understanding
of the misappropriation doctrine, documenting the main causes and con-
sequences of this turn.  Part II articulates an alternative theoretical frame-
work for misappropriation, drawing on the interface between unjust en-
richment as a structural principle and unfair competition as a set of
normative ideals in the common law.  Part III then explains the signifi-
cance of this difference, highlighting the doctrinal, remedial, and First
Amendment consequences that are likely to flow from adopting one ap-
proach over the other.
I. DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR:  HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION AS A
PROPERTY ACTION
Arguments for owning the news date back to the mid-nineteenth
century.  Melville Stone, then head of the Chicago Daily News, and later
President of the AP, made it his primary objective to have the law recog-
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nize the idea of a property right in the news.39  A strong utilitarian, his
primary motivation for the idea arose from the acts of his competitors,
who flagrantly copied the news from his newspaper on a systematic ba-
sis.40  At the time, a property right would have enabled the Daily News to
sue its competitors and presumably enjoin them preemptively from such
copying.  Equitable relief, in the nature of injunctive relief, was the prin-
cipal result that early proponents of a property right in the news
sought.41
This remedial conception of property as no more than a basis for
injunctive relief manifested itself in early decisions grappling with the is-
sue of property in news.  In one well-known decision, the Seventh Circuit
extensively elaborated on the need to recognize a property interest in
news only for the purposes of providing injunctive relief.42  When the
matter reached the Supreme Court in International News, the majority,
however, declined to decide the case on the basis of property.43  Justice
Holmes too, in his cryptic concurrence, refused to recognize property as
forming the basis of any relief.44  Despite this, the Court granted the
plaintiff injunctive relief based on a quasi-property theory of unfair com-
petition and unjust enrichment.45
If injunctive relief was all that the early controversy about a property
right in the news was about, the Court’s decision in International News
might have ended the debate.  It seemingly produced what the newspa-
per industry, led by Stone at the time, wanted:  a right to have courts
enjoin competitive copying.  Yet, when the doctrine came to be absorbed
by different state laws and resurrected as the hot news doctrine, it none-
theless came to be interpreted as actively producing a property right in
the news.46  In the intervening period between 1918 and 1992, the body
of judicial and scholarly writing about intellectual property and its con-
nection to the general idea of property had grown exponentially.47  As an
39. Baird, Uneasy Legacy, supra note 9, at 11 (“Melville Stone is the person most R
responsible for developing the idea of a property right in news.”).
40. These were the McMullen brothers, who owned the Chicago Post and the Chicago
Mail.  Id.; see also Melville E. Stone, Fifty Years a Journalist 355–56 (1921) (describing
practice of copying from newspapers without permission as “universal” and his desire to
find legal remedy in the form of a property right).
41. Stone, supra note 40, at 337–38 (quoting Frederic Jennings, then General R
Counsel of the Associated Press).
42. Nat’l Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 299–301 (7th Cir. 1902).
43. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234–35 (1918).
44. Id. at 246–48 (Holmes, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 236 (majority opinion) (“Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material
out of which both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same
field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be
regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the public.”).
46. See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852–53 (2d Cir.
1997) (treating International News as establishing “hot-news” misappropriation claim).
47. See generally Douglas C. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the
Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 411 (1983)
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action relating to an informational intangible (i.e., the news), it thus
seemed logical to treat misappropriation as just another intellectual prop-
erty doctrine, akin to copyright, trade secrets, or publicity rights.  It is
here that the reintroduction of property ideas and rhetoric assumes sig-
nificance, but for seemingly different (or rather, additional) reasons.
Thus, when the Second Circuit concluded that hot news misappropria-
tion was not about ethics but rather about property rights, its focus was
not just on injunctive relief.  Indeed, the court’s opinion did not even
deal with the issue of remedies, since it found for the defendant on the
substantive issue.48
A property right in an informational good, along the lines of intellec-
tual property, now implied a different set of consequences.  And surely
enough, courts interpreting and applying the misappropriation doctrine
took their cue from the Second Circuit’s proclamation, and began mov-
ing the law in this direction.  Three such interrelated moves—all of which
derive from the identification of news as the basis of a property interest,
and indeed themselves contributed to it—are worth describing here:  (1)
the recognition and validation of an ex ante licensing market for time-
sensitive news; (2) the increased emphasis on the in rem or nonrelational
nature of the entitlement in misappropriation; and (3) the use of injunc-
tive relief as the default remedy in hot news cases.
A. An Ex Ante Licensing Market
Central to all forms of intellectual property remains an owner’s abil-
ity to license others to use the subject matter of the right on exclusive or
nonexclusive terms.49  An owner can, in other words, contractually alien-
ate his ability to exclude another from the object of the right on such
terms as he deems fit.  Needless to say, this provides the owner or right
holder with an additional source of revenue of importance in the newspa-
per industry.  All the same, the growth of a licensing market for the news
has both been fueled by, and in itself contributed to, a propertarian vi-
sion of hot news misappropriation.
[hereinafter Baird, Common Law] (describing development of misappropriation as form
of common law intellectual property); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still
Property, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 108 (1990) (linking intellectual property to traditional
property); Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press:  Custom and Law
as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L. Rev. 85 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein,
Custom and Law] (discussing particular circumstances of International News and general
system of property rights surrounding it); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual
Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287 (1988) (exploring philosophical justifications for granting
property rights to ideas).
48. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 853, 855.
49. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption:  The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 111 (1999) (discussing ability of parties to
contract over use of intellectual property while analyzing proposed change to Uniform
Commercial Code); Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing in the Contemporary Information
Economy, 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 99 (2002) (analyzing licensing of information).
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For a licensing market to come into existence, it is crucial that the
licensor have an identifiable right or entitlement ex ante that can form
the subject matter of the license.50  In other words, a potential licensee
will most often need to know the nature and extent of a licensor’s author-
ity under the entitlement before it is adjudicated by a court.  The exis-
tence of a bright-line ex ante interest is thus crucial to the success of a
thick licensing market.51  Here again, the fact that intellectual property
regimes are modeled on traditional property interests means that the law
recognizes an identifiable interest even before its holder attempts to en-
force it in a court of law during an infringement action.  For instance, the
entitlement in copyright law is presumed to come into existence the mo-
ment an author creates an original work of authorship that is fixed in a
tangible medium, and in patent law it commences upon a formal grant by
the government.  The owner’s attempt to exercise the exclusivity of the
right during an infringement action in court is thus merely an attempt to
enforce a preexisting right.
The existence and effectiveness of such a licensing market thus de-
pends to a large degree on the identification and demarcation of rights
by the parties involved.  One obvious way of achieving this is by attaching
the rights directly to a discrete asset or resource, adopting what Henry
Smith describes as the exclusion regime of delineating an entitlement.52
Attaching a right to an actual or notional resource and framing it in
terms of “simple on/off signals” involving the resource minimizes the va-
rious information and transaction costs involved, and consequently sim-
50. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 100 (1988) (noting “[o]ne
well-confirmed result in the literature on bargaining is that bargainers are more likely to
cooperate when their rights are clear,” which explains “why property law favors criteria for
determining ownership that are clear and simple”).  But see Jason Scott Johnston,
Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 256, 257 (1995) (arguing,
against conventional wisdom, that judicial ex post balancing test may result in more
efficient bargaining than ex ante clearly defined rule, given existence of private
information about value and harm).
51. For an analogous argument in the patent law context, see Craig Allen Nard,
Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 Ind. L.J. 759, 759–60 (1999).
52. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L.
Rev. 965, 972–73, 75 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Law of Nuisance] (“Under an exclusion
regime, the law uses a rough informational variable or signal—such as entry—to define the
right, and thus bunches together a range of uses that juries, judges, and other officials
need never measure directly.” (emphasis omitted)); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S453,
S454–55 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Two Strategies] (“In exclusion, decisions about
resource use are delegated to an owner who, as gatekeeper, is responsible for deciding on
and monitoring specific activities with respect to the resource.”); Henry E. Smith, Property
and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1755–56 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property
Rules] (“In an exclusion strategy, the law sets up rough signals (informational variables,
proxies) defining the boundaries of the asset.  Within this zone of protection, owners have
the choice of how to invest in or consume the asset.” (emphasis omitted)).
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plifies the process of licensing it to strangers.53  This is especially so when
the right relates to nonrivalrous information.  A potential licensee has no
way of evaluating the information/intangible until it is disclosed to him;
yet, upon such disclosure he has little reason to want to pay for it.54
Known as Arrow’s information paradox, this reality is thought to lie at the
root of the tendency to propertize the entitlement being transacted in, by
attaching it to a discrete asset around which an exclusionary legal frame-
work then operates, independent of any contractual agreement between
the parties.55  Robert Merges thus argues that property rights (in the na-
ture of intellectual property entitlements) allow parties to overcome
Arrow’s paradox by providing licensors with a basis for recourse, indepen-
dent of the actual license (which may never fructify), thereby providing
for a form of precontractual liability.56  Propertizing information thus di-
rectly facilitates contractual transactions relating to such information.
Two things become central then to the effective functioning of a licens-
ing market:  (1) the ex ante characterization of the entitlement as a prop-
erty right, and (2) the law’s attaching it to an identifiable res, albeit a
notional one.
It was only a matter of time before news purveyors sought to capital-
ize on the licensing opportunities that emerged from a propertarian (or
commodified) vision of news.  If a collector of hot news could exclude a
competitor from free riding on its news (using the misappropriation doc-
trine), surely it could now seek to charge such competitors in return for
not suing them:  the very premise of licensing.  This change is seen in the
AP’s own rhetoric surrounding the hot news doctrine.  Whereas in 1918,
it had categorically told the Court that it was “not asking [for] any exclu-
sive right”57 to communicate the news, in 2009 it would declare that it was
merely seeking appropriate compensation that paid it fully and fairly for
its news.58  Its reasons for this shift are obvious.  As a historical matter, the
newspaper industry had relied entirely on advertising as its primary
53. Smith, Law of Nuisance, supra note 52, at 973; see, e.g., Henry E. Smith, R
Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2120 (2009)
(“The modular structure of exclusion-based intellectual property rights . . . makes . . .
contracting more tractable.”).
54. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 609, 615 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research ed., 1962) (“[T]here is a fundamental paradox in the determination of demand
for information; its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but
then he has in effect acquired it without cost.”).
55. Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
1477, 1490, 1499 (2005) [hereinafter Merges, Transactional View].  For an application to
trade secrets law, see Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as
IP Rights, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 336–37 (2008).
56. Merges, Transactional View, supra note 55, at 1489–504. R
57. See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, News Piracy and the Hot News Doctrine 72 (2005)
(citing Brief for Respondent at 10, Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)
(No. 221)).
58. Singleton, supra note 19. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\111-3\COL301.txt unknown Seq: 16 23-MAR-11 11:27
434 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 111:419
source of revenue.  As this source began to diminish, the industry began
to look for new revenue-earning opportunities, and the licensing market
emerged as an obvious candidate.  For this to work effectively, though,
misappropriation had to be understood as an ex ante legal entitlement,
one with boundaries that could be identified prior to a dispute/litigation,
and which preferably revolved around a discrete asset—news.
Developing and reinforcing this licensing market has been central to
the newspaper industry’s use of the misappropriation doctrine in recent
years.  In Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., the plaintiff com-
menced a hot news misappropriation action against a defendant with
whom it had previously entered into a licensing agreement.59  When the
defendant stopped paying the plaintiff its fees under the agreement but
nonetheless continued to make commercial use of its news service, the
plaintiff resorted to hot news misappropriation as an independent basis
of recovery.  Around the same time, the AP also commenced a hot news
misappropriation action against news-aggregating defendants in
Associated Press v. Moreover Technologies, Inc.60  In this action, the AP made
no secret of its attempted propertization of the news, repeatedly referring
to the subject matter of its hot news claim as proprietary.61  Both actions
were ultimately settled, and the AP’s licensing market is today extremely
robust as a result.62
The relationship between the development of a licensing market for
news and the metamorphosis of hot news misappropriation into a prop-
erty claim is also strongly reflexive.  While a property-based understand-
ing of the doctrine certainly facilitates the growth of licensing, the ready
recourse to such licensing by competitors (and others) in their use of the
news has also facilitated an understanding of hot news misappropriation
as creating an ownership interest in the news.  Referred to as the phe-
nomenon of doctrinal feedback, its prevalence is well documented in the
context of copyright and trademark law.63  Courts interpreting the doctri-
nal scope of copyright (and trademark) law look to prevailing licensing
practices among market participants, and readily infer the existence of an
ex ante legal entitlement over a type of use/copying when licenses de-
scribe the entitlement in those terms.  This, as scholars have noted, ig-
nores the reality that potential licensees tend to be risk averse, preferring
59. 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Complaint at 12–13, Associated Press v.
All Headline News Corp., No. 08 Civ. 00323 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2008).
60. Complaint at 1–2, 4–14, Associated Press v. Moreover Techs., Inc., No. 07 Civ.
8699 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2007).
61. Id. at 11–12.
62. In the former action, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on its claims of hot
news misappropriation and copyright infringement, and against the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. Associated Press, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 458–62.  The AP has since asserted that the hot
news doctrine that developed in such actions “was important to [its] efforts to protect its
intellectual property.”  FTC Discussion Draft, supra note 24, at 10. R
63. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 884–85 (2007).
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to obtain a license even in situations where they remain unsure about the
precise contours of a licensor’s entitlement.64  The continuing, unabated
growth of a licensing market for the factual news thus runs the obvious
risk of itself contributing to an expansive propertarian understanding of
hot news as creating an ownership interest in the news.
B. An In Rem Interest
One of the characteristic features of a property right is its structure
as an in rem right—operational against the world at large.  This is in con-
trast to interests that are thought to operate against a specific individual
or set of individuals, classified as in personam rights or interests.65  Yet,
the distinction between the two is not one of mere numerosity, a fact that
is often ignored.  In other words, an in rem right is not merely a collec-
tion of in personam rights.  Property rights are in rem interests because
the set of individuals against whom they operate remains indefinite at all
times, unlike in personam rights that operate against a definite set of
individuals.66  The problem, however, is that between the two extremes of
definite and indefinite are a number of situations that are hard to fit into
one category or the other.  It is here that misappropriation’s status as a
doctrine creating a property right becomes problematic.
In International News, Justice Pitney chose to characterize the right he
was creating as a form of quasi-property precisely because it elided the
standard in rem/in personam distinction used to identify property inter-
ests.67  The exclusionary framework created would thus operate only be-
tween direct competitors in a market.68  A quasi-property right holder
had an interest against a class of individuals that while definite in one
sense (i.e., being composed only of competitors), nonetheless remained
indefinite in another, since such competitors could be perfect strangers
with whom the plaintiff had had no prior interaction.  The existence of
the right was thus largely conditional, since it depended to a large degree
on the preexisting identity of the defendant, something largely unheard
64. See, e.g., id. at 887 (observing how uncertainty exacerbates this risk aversion).
65. This distinction is usually traced back to the work of Wesley Hohfeld.  See Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
Yale L.J. 710, 718–19 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions] (analyzing
use of legal conceptions such as “in personam” and “in rem”).  For recent work explaining
the distinction in terms of information costs, see generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773 (2001).
66. Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions, supra note 65, at 718; Albert Kocourek, R
Rights in Rem, 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 322, 322 (1920).
67. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (“[F]or this purpose,
and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of
either as against the public.”).
68. Id. at 239 (“The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the
complainant as against the public, instead of considering the rights of complainant and
defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves.”).
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of in standard intellectual property regimes at the time and now.69
Among other things, it was this unique structural attribute of misappro-
priation that kept it from being just another form of property/intellec-
tual property.
In its most recent iteration, however, courts interpreting and apply-
ing the doctrine have paid insufficient attention to the identity require-
ment upon which International News placed much emphasis.  In interpret-
ing the International News opinion, the Second Circuit in National
Basketball Ass’n shifted its focus and requirement from whether the plain-
tiffs and defendants were competitor firms to one of whether the defen-
dant’s actions compete with a product or service offered by the plain-
tiffs.70  In doing so, however, the court failed to suggest any type of test to
be followed in applying this restriction.  As courts invoked the doctrine
outside the realm of news and factual information, those courts began
paying increasingly less attention to this element, effectively distancing it
from its origins as an identity-based limitation on the applicability of the
doctrine.
This is not to imply that the identity-based restriction disfavors ex-
tending the doctrine to new subject matter.  In contrast to the Second
Circuit, in the Third Circuit courts sought to preserve the identity-based
structure of the requirement in International News by drawing a distinction
between direct and indirect competition, even when dealing with subject
matter unrelated to news.71  Direct competition is meant to represent an
identity-based limit, while indirect competition represents a product-
based approach.  Yet, few courts have followed suit; the recent trend ap-
pears to be toward an approach that looks for some minimal level of sub-
stitutability between the products and services of the parties.72
The effect of relaxing this restriction has thus been to move the in-
terest created by misappropriation in the direction of a traditional in rem
right, applicable against an indefinite class of individuals, the obvious
characteristic of a property right.
69. For a similar claim alluding to this distinction, see Gordon, Restitutionary
Impulse, supra note 34, at 211 (describing restitutionary interest as relational).  Note that R
the idea of a relational interest as used by Gordon bears no connection to the well-known
category made popular by tort scholar Leon Green.  See Leon Green, Relational Interests,
29 Ill. L. Rev. 460, 460 (1934) (developing an independent category of relational interests
in the common law).
70. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852 (2d Cir. 1997)
(framing competition as competitive product or service rather than competitive firm).
71. See U.S. Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1037–38 (3d
Cir. 1984) (finding “absence of direct competition” dispositive in case).
72. See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310,
336–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (condemning Fly’s actions as using Barclay’s work as a substitute
for its own by “systematically gathering and selling the [f]irms’ [r]ecommendations to
investors”); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107–09 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(finding significant that defendant’s activities will “remove X17’s incentive to gather the
photographs and threaten the continued existence of X17’s business”).
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C. Automatic Injunctions
The idea of hot news misappropriation as creating a property right
in the news, which fuels and is fueled by the licensing of news, also im-
pacts courts’ conception of remedies.  As noted earlier, the ability to en-
join free-riding competitors lays at the heart of the industry’s attempts to
have the law recognize a property right in the news.73  Much of this
originated in the distinction that courts of equity insisted on drawing be-
tween proprietary and nonproprietary rights for the purposes of granting
equitable (i.e., injunctive) relief.74  While originally an attempt to differ-
entiate interests in land from other kinds of interests, courts soon began
stretching the idea of proprietary rights in many instances with the exclu-
sive objective of granting plaintiffs equitable relief in accordance with this
age-old distinction.75 International News, in some ways, broke with that
tradition by refusing to classify the interest as a property right, but none-
theless affirmed the lower court’s temporary injunction in the case as a
remedial matter.  In the first instance then, injunctive relief motivated a
property-based understanding of the hot news doctrine.
Ever since International News, plaintiffs succeeding on the merits in
hot news cases have invariably obtained injunctive relief.76  Indeed, an
automatic injunction rule appears to have emerged,77 under which courts
do not even consider the adequacy of monetary damages before proceed-
ing to enjoin a defendant.  Since at least the seminal work of Calabresi
and Melamed, the remedial conception of property rights as entitlements
obtaining property rule protection regardless of their normative content
has continued to dominate the legal landscape.78  Property rights are
73. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text (discussing newspapers’ efforts to R
use property right to enjoin free riders).
74. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude:  Of
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 593, 642–43
(2008) [hereinafter Balganesh, Right to Exclude] (describing origins of this distinction in
equity and its implications for property doctrine).
75. See Green, supra note 69, at 461 (documenting this phenomenon among courts). R
76. See, e.g., Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575, 582–83 (9th Cir. 1935)
(granting preliminary injunctive relief); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. New Eng. Newspaper
Publ’g Co., 46 F. Supp. 198, 204 (D. Mass. 1942) (granting injunctive relief to plaintiff
despite defendant’s request for an exception); Dior v. Milton, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443, 463 (Sup.
Ct. 1956) (denying motion to dismiss complaint and injunctive relief).  But see U.S.
Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex. App.
1993) (observing that injunctive relief was not only remedy available in hot news cases
under Texas law).
77. The Federal Circuit had developed a similar “automatic injunction” rule for
patent infringement, which the Supreme Court recently abrogated.  See eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (eliminating automatic injunction
rule and requiring courts to use traditional four-factor test in deciding whether to grant
injunctive relief).
78. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1089–93 (1972)
(explaining why entitlements should receive property rule protection); see also Balganesh,
Right to Exclude, supra note 74, at 649–57 (discussing remedial conception of property). R
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thus rights where courts are willing to grant plaintiffs injunctive relief.79
With an automatic injunction rule for hot news cases firmly in place, the
tendency today is to readily assume that the doctrine is directed at creat-
ing and protecting a property right in the news.
* * *
An important caveat is in order here.  One might argue that the de-
velopments this Part identified as propertarian do not necessarily flow
from the mere identification of hot news misappropriation as creating a
property interest in the news.  In other words, the idea of property as
such might be seen as doing little to produce these consequences itself.
To the extent that they do derive from property thinking, they might be
seen as originating in a very particular conception of property—one that
is both absolutist and essentialist.80  Whether or not this is true, and in-
deed whether the idea of property has one meaning or several, remains
somewhat orthogonal to the argument advanced here.  The claim here is
that regardless of whether the hot news doctrine can be understood as a
propertarian doctrine, it should not be understood to entail the conse-
quences associated with an absolutist conception of property, which it
unquestionably has through a two-way reflexive relationship with the idea
of property.  Rooting its normative basis in unjust enrichment instead of
property would serve to minimize this.  This Part leaves for another time
and place the broader question of what the idea of property does and
should mean in the abstract.
II. RECONSTRUCTING HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION AS A
NONPROPRIETARY INTEREST
Having examined the gradual crystallization of misappropriation
into a doctrine creating a presumptive property interest in news, this Part
offers a theory of the doctrine that situates it at the interface of unjust
enrichment law and the common law of unfair competition.  Specifically,
it describes how the synthesis of ideas and principles from both areas
generates a framework for solving the collective action problem of con-
cern in the market for newsgathering.
In International News, Justice Pitney made a somewhat conscious ef-
fort to avoid framing misappropriation in property terms.  Given what the
plaintiffs were seeking in the case and Justice Brandeis’s dissent concern-
79. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 52, at 1724 (discussing and critiquing this R
connection).
80. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 Yale L.J.
1126, 1133 (2009) (describing property absolutism and essentialism).  For criticism of
unidimensional property thinking along these lines, see generally Hanoch Dagan, The
Craft of Property, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1517 (2003) (criticizing Court’s opinion in United States
v. Craft for doing this in relation to marital property); Hanoch Dagan, Property and the
Public Domain, 18 Yale J.L. & Human. 84 (2006) (applying this critique to intellectual
property scholarship’s relationship to property ideas and concepts).
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ing the inability of judges to create new property interests,81 Justice
Pitney chose to name the interest he was recognizing as a form of quasi-
property, observing that it would not create a right against the world at
large (i.e., in rem) like traditional property interests.82  Later courts and
scholars have since dismissed the term quasi-property as meaningless.83
Yet, Justice Pitney may have had a purpose in using it—especially since
the term quasi-contract was for long thought to be connected to the gen-
eral principle of unjust enrichment.84
Justice Pitney, interestingly enough, was well aware of unjust enrich-
ment as an independent basis of liability in the common law.  Indeed, in
an opinion he wrote around the same time as International News, he made
express reference to the idea.85  By framing his discussion in terms of the
principle of reaping without sowing rather than theft, he was perhaps
alluding to unjust enrichment as the structural basis of misappropriation,
a reality that scholars have noted in the past.86  Additionally, in describ-
ing the functioning of the entitlement, he made express reference to the
norms of “unfair competition in business.”87  Quasi-property was thus
meant to be an entitlement that sounded in unjust enrichment and un-
fair competition, both at once.  Nonetheless, by failing to explicate his
choice of structural vehicle for the doctrine, Justice Pitney left the extent
to which it remains distinct from property (other than in nomenclature)
uncertain.  This Part attempts to resolve this uncertainty.
It is worth noting an important caveat before proceeding.  Justice
Pitney’s opinion, on the face of things, lends itself to multiple theoretical
justifications for the doctrine of misappropriation he developed.  All the
same, observations in the opinion nonetheless cut against every one of
those theories—including that of unjust enrichment.  The theoretical frame-
81. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede a
determination of the limitations which should be set upon any property right in news.”).
82. Id. at 236 (majority opinion).
83. See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that quasi-property nomenclature has “little meaningful legal significance”); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:  The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 19–20 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal
Standardization] (criticizing doctrine of misappropriation for having “taken on a life of its
own”).
84. See Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 34, at 267 (arguing that Court R
may have borrowed the idea of quasi-property from quasi-contract); see also Peter Birks,
An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 29–39 (1985) [hereinafter Birks, Restitution]
(explaining development of term “quasi-contract” and its connection to unjust enrichment
in common law).
85. Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239, 254 (1920) (Pitney, J.) (commenting that
principle of “reaping without sowing” adds an element of unjust enrichment).
86. See, e.g., Callmann, What is Unfair?, supra note 35, at 606–07 & n.56; John P. R
Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1415–17 (1974) (discussing
International News in context of restitution law’s rules against recovery by a self-serving
intermeddler).
87. International News, 248 U.S. at 240.
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work offered here is thus not an attempt to discern Justice Pitney’s true
intent, or to argue that this is the only way of making sense of the opin-
ion.  Instead, it attempts to situate the opinion within the broader context
of the newspaper industry (for whom it was developed) to argue that this
context left a clear impact on the structure of the doctrine that has con-
tinued in the decades since.  Thus, while it looks to the opinion in
International News, it does so in both positive and reconstructive terms.
In analyzing the common law doctrine of misappropriation, this Part
begins with the functional and then moves to the structural.  First, it
shows how the hot news misappropriation doctrine originates in the idea
of unfair competition and is directed at preventing a market-based harm
different from that ordinarily associated with traditional intellectual prop-
erty.  Douglas Baird’s illuminating account of the background to the
International News opinion provides an important window into the various
considerations that might have influenced the Court in its choice of
framework.88  Second, it argues that the framework that the doctrine of
misappropriation adopts is more closely aligned with the structural
precepts of unjust enrichment, rather than property, and sets out the
core elements of this difference and its manifestation.
A. Unfair Competition as the Functional Basis of Misappropriation
Just as Justice Pitney was familiar with unjust enrichment as a struc-
tural idea, he was also well acquainted with the principle of unfair compe-
tition.  In International News, he observed that his opinion did not origi-
nate in property ideas, but instead “turn[ed] upon the question” of
unfair competition, and found that the defendant’s misappropriation of
the news collected by the plaintiff constituted an act of unfair competi-
tion opposed to “good conscience.”89  His use of the idea of unfair com-
petition was not coincidental, for he had just authored several opinions
addressing the idea right before International News, and in many of them
had even spent some effort developing a taxonomy of the concept.90  Mis-
appropriation thus originated in the Court’s use of unjust enrichment as
a structural vehicle in service of the goals of unfair competition.
1. Harm from Free Riding in the Market for Timely News. — Analyzing
the form of market-based harm that the misappropriation doctrine is di-
88. See Baird, Uneasy Legacy, supra note 9 (discussing International News and R
historical background to it).
89. International News, 248 U.S. at 235, 240.
90. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“The law
of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.”); Hitchman Coal &
Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 259 (1917) (describing facts as meriting “an injunction
to restrain . . . unfair competition”); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield & Ogilvie, 241 U.S.
22, 24 (1916) (noting that case involves “unfair competition in the business of publishing
and selling dictionaries”); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916)
(observing how common law of trademarks was part of broader area of unfair
competition); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 256 (1916)
(describing case as “one of unfair competition without trade-mark infringement”).
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rected at requires understanding the structure of the market for new-
sgathering.  Newspaper content consists of two independent components
from a legal point of view.  The first is the actual expressive content of
news stories, which forms the subject matter of copyright protection.
Here, news stories obtain protection in exactly the same way as do other
forms of literary works.  Yet, copyright law consciously excludes both
ideas and facts from its coverage, based in large part on free speech and
First Amendment concerns.91  Thus, while copyright protects the expres-
sion in news stories, it does not protect the underlying factual content
which is meant to remain in the public domain, freely accessible to any-
one to use or disseminate.92
Just because factual information is deemed ineligible for copyright
protection does not mean that it is without economic value.  For newspa-
pers, facts, rather than literary expression, are often their core contribu-
tion.93  In other words, the news is characteristically associated less with
literary expression than with the communication of the bare facts of
events that transpired in the immediate past.  Additionally, and perhaps
most importantly, these facts are valuable because of their time sensitivity.
Since newspapers focus on the delivery of factual information via their
news stories, their delivery needs to be as proximate as possible in time to
the actual event.  And if the collection of factual information entails some
cost, its collection in a timely manner in order to render it newsworthy
adds another huge component to that cost.
Newsworthy facts are valuable principally because of their timeliness;
the commercial value of news diminishes over time.  Audiences are
clearly willing to pay more for information of recent occurrences than
they are for information about events that transpired in the distant past.
The principal investment that newspapers make in newsgathering is thus
directed at capturing the time value of news.94
As a nonexcludable resource, factual information about public
events is hard to contain.  This is especially true with the advent of new
communication technologies.  Thus, if a major political event transpires
91. See 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.11 (2010)
(providing overview of protection for factual works such as news).
92. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1981)
(denying copyright protection to factual content of news stories).
93. Though ironically, a vastly greater percentage of their advertising revenue comes
from the non-news parts of newspapers, which they use to cross-subsidize news collection.
The more targeted forms of advertising that these other, special interest sections allow for
explains this reality.  See Hal Varian, Newspaper Economics:  Online and Offline, Google
Public Policy Blog (Mar. 9, 2010, 9:00 AM), at http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/
2010/03/newspaper-economics-online-and-offline.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting most advertising revenue for newspapers comes primarily from “special
interest sections” rather than from news).
94. For an excellent overview of the idea of time value in newsgathering and its
emergence as a major source of competition among newspapers in the nineteenth century,
see Menahem Blondheim, News over the Wires:  The Telegraph and the Flow of Public
Information in America, 1844–1897, at 11–29 (1994).
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in a distant country and no newspaper reports it, the fact of its occur-
rence will nonetheless be communicated in due course, through the sim-
ple exchange and flow of information between individuals.  While this
would have occurred even before the arrival of digital communication, its
advent has only made such dissemination immediate and multimodal.
What newspapers bring to the picture then is systematic collection in a
timely and accurate manner, which makes the market for news about
more than just information aggregation and dissemination.
Now consider a situation of free riding in this market.  One partici-
pant in the market (i.e., a newspaper) may decide to cut costs by choos-
ing not to collect factual information independently, but instead to pick
up (and report) such facts from a competitor’s stories right after they are
published.  For this strategy to work, obviously the news needs to retain
economic value for a period of time longer than the lag between the two
independent instances of publication.  If this were to happen, the free
rider saves on the cost of collecting the information as such, which in-
cludes the added costs of collecting it when it retains time-dependent
economic value.  The reason for differentiating between the two, while
largely conceptual, derives in turn from the effects of the free rider’s ac-
tions on the collector’s incentives.
If the free rider performed his actions after the factual elements had
lost their time value, its effect on the collector’s ex ante incentive would
be very different.  Its effect would be greatly diminished, since the major
(or principal) value in news reporting derives from its timeliness.  Since
news collectors derive their incentive to invest in the act of collecting
from the economic value inherent in the timeliness of the collection,
when the free riding impacts that value it impairs the entire process of
collection.  The concern, from a competition point of view, is that al-
lowing a free rider’s actions to continue unabated might diminish a col-
lector’s incentive to the point where the timeliness of the news collection
is compromised.  If a newsgatherer invests heavily in making sure that its
journalists collect news stories within minutes of their development but
begins to see competitors saving enormous costs (and thus earning
greater profits) by deciding to wait and free ride on the newsgatherer’s
efforts, the newsgatherer’s most likely rational response will be to wait
too, without some assurance that its efforts are not going to be taken
advantage of by a competitor, or indeed several of them.
Therefore, extensive free riding by competitors is likely to result in
the delay of the collection and dissemination of news, with most partici-
pants choosing to free ride or wait.  Its effects will likely impact the mar-
ket for the timely collection and dissemination of news as a whole.  Dem-
ocratic discourse and political accountability—functions historically
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served by a vibrant newspaper industry—are likely to suffer in the process
as the collection and dissemination of news become less timely.95
Understanding that the harm from free riding in the market for
news collection derives from the time value of news was central to the
Court’s reasoning in International News.  In his dissent, Justice Brandeis
worried that the majority’s approach effectively penalized all forms of
free riding as a general rule.96  Justice Pitney’s opinion for the majority,
though, possibly in response to the dissent, recognized the peculiar char-
acteristics of the market for news, and focused its attention on the preser-
vation of the time value inherent in news.  Justice Pitney’s opinion re-
ferred extensively to the economic value of “promptness”97 in news
collection and delivery, beginning from the premise that the “peculiar
value of news is in the spreading of it while it is fresh.”98  The market-
based harm that formed the basis of the misappropriation doctrine he
formulated was the harm to a news collector’s economic incentive to par-
ticipate in the market—a harm that derived exclusively from a competi-
tor’s free riding when the news retained time sensitive economic value.
The defendant’s free riding, the opinion emphasized, was problematic
not because it sought to reap without sowing in the abstract, but because
it did so “at the point where the profit is to be reaped”99—a clear reference
to the time-sensitivity that made the free riding competitively harmful.
Justice Pitney’s solution to the problem largely reflected this conception
of harm.
2. A Framework for Continuing Cooperation. — The misappropriation
doctrine needs to be understood against the backdrop of newsgathering
practices dominant at the time of International News.  This section argues
that even though Justice Pitney’s opinion merely alluded to these prac-
tices and their centrality to newspapers, in reality they had a major effect
on the choice of framework around which the doctrine came to be struc-
tured.  It begins by looking at two sets of such practices:  collective new-
sgathering100 and sharing tips among competing newspapers.101  It then
proceeds to analyze the problems that the Court might have seen in cre-
ating a simple property interest in the news,102 and concludes by drawing
95. Borrowing a phrase from Richard Epstein, this may be characterized as the
“externality of . . . ignorance.”  Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 47, at 113. R
96. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common use.”)
97. Id. at 230 (majority opinion) (noting that value of news “depends upon the
promptness of transmission”).
98. Id. at 235.
99. Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
100. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
101. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
102. See infra Part II.A.2.c.
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attention to the Court’s focus on annulling a defendant’s unfair advan-
tage in its formulation of misappropriation.103
a. Two Mutually Reinforcing Norms. — The misappropriation doctrine
originated in the need to develop a solution to the free rider problem in
the market for time sensitive news.  The answer needed to provide news
collectors with a sufficient incentive to continue to invest in the process
of collecting news and information with promptness.  All the same, it
needed to recognize and deal with the fact that news was a common pool
resource, whose ultimate social value lay in its widest possible dissemina-
tion to the public.
It certainly was not the case that prior to the advent of the misappro-
priation doctrine, newspapers routinely adopted the strategy of free rid-
ing or waiting for others rather than collecting the news.  Unlike in the
standard prisoner’s dilemma where parties cannot communicate (and
therefore cannot cooperate), the possibility of communication, repeat in-
teractions, and observable behavior in news collection resulted in the de-
velopment of industry-wide norms among newspapers.104  Among the
first of these to develop was, most importantly, a norm against free rid-
ing.105  Relying entirely on the efforts of a competitor without its consent
was considered unethical and highly objectionable behavior.  Free riding
of this sort was considered especially problematic when done without
crediting the original.  All the same, crediting the source when the free
riding was substantial entailed huge reputational consequences for a free
rider, which made it rare.  The norm against free riding was enforced
largely through reputational sanctions.  In one well-known incident in
the 1830s, a national daily, whose stories were being copied without credit
by a local competitor, decided to produce a version with a completely
fabricated story as a hoax.106  The free riding competitor picked up the
false story and carried it, but the original newspaper immediately pulled
the story and ran a denial, exposing its competitor to the public as a free
rider.107
103. See infra Part II.A.2.d.
104. For a discussion of this phenomenon, converting a prisoner’s dilemma situation
into a coordination game in other contexts, see generally Dennis Chong, Collective Action
and the Civil Rights Movement 103–07 (1991); Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens:  Studies
in Rationality and Irrationality 146 (1979); Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman,
Institutions Matter!  Why the Herder Problem Is Not a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 69 Theory &
Decision 219 (2008); Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the
Rule of Law, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 245, 249 (1997).
105. For an excellent overview of how these developments occurred very shortly after
the emergence of newsgathering as a commercial activity, see Victor Rosewater, History of
Coöperative News-Gathering in the United States 14–20 (1930) (“[T]he Courier and
Enquirer [were] bent on exposing those appropriating its news without credit . . . .”).
106. Id. at 18–19.
107. Isaac Clarke Pray, Memoirs of James Gordon Bennett and His Times 135 (1855).
Pray describes this incident as follows:
The Courier and Enquirer a few days after the announcement of the fall of
Warsaw, in the Polish War, in order to expose those who were guilty of
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\111-3\COL301.txt unknown Seq: 27 23-MAR-11 11:27
2011] ENDURING MYTH OF PROPERTY IN NEWS 445
The norm against free riding was not, however, the only norm that
the newspaper industry came to develop—a reality that previous discus-
sions of the misappropriation doctrine have ignored.108  Alongside the
norm against free riding, very early on newspapers developed mecha-
nisms of cooperation in the newsgathering exercise.109  Much of this
stemmed from the realization that competitive news collection, where
each newspaper would send its own agents to collect the news, was highly
duplicative and cost-ineffective.  Indeed, newspapers realized this fact
even when the only form of news collection entailed sending small boats
(schooners and clippers) to collect the news from foreign ships that had
anchored off the coast.  Realizing that competing to build better and
faster boats was a wasteful race, several of them decided to pool their
resources into building a single, larger ship.110  Cooperative newsgather-
ing soon emerged as an industry-wide practice among newspapers, ini-
tially in largely informal ways.  This practice drew reinforcement from the
anti-free riding norm that developed alongside it.
In due course, cooperative newsgathering grew to be a formal prac-
tice among competitors.  With the creation of the AP in the mid-nine-
teenth century and other large newsgathering cooperatives thereafter, co-
operative newsgathering came to be institutionalized.  By the time of
International News, the AP had approximately 950 members,111 and the
International News Service (INS) had 400 members of its own.112  They
each had formal rules about news collection and sharing among mem-
appropriating news without credit, prepared a denial of the original account, and
printed a small edition, prepared expressly to reach the offices of the morning
journals [i.e., the free riders].  The statement purported to be gleaned from
papers brought by the ship Ajax.  There was no such arrival.  The article was
copied by several papers, and [one free riding local newspaper] sent it forth in
the country edition as news which had been obtained originally by its own
enterprise. . . . Other papers announced the news without giving any credit to the
source of it.  The hoax created much excitement among journalists; and the
public, or that small portion of society, to which newspapers were familiar,
enjoyed the joke.
Id.  For an additional account of this event, see Frederic Hudson, Journalism in the United
States, from 1690–1872, at 347 (New York, Harper Bros. 1873).
108. See, e.g., Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 47, at 97 (describing R
misappropriation as having affirmed industry norm against free riding).
109. See Rosewater, supra note 105, at 14–20 (discussing cooperation in gathering R
“ship news in advance of docking”); Richard A. Schwarzlose, Cooperative News Gathering,
in American Journalism:  History, Principles, Practices 153, 153–62 (W. David Sloan & Lisa
Mullikin Parcell eds., 2002) (examining typical forms of cooperative newsgathering).  For a
comprehensive history of this development, see generally id. (detailing cooperative
newsgathering from its beginnings through rise of the AP).  In discussing conditions in the
industry around the early nineteenth century, Rosewater noted:  “Because of the relative
costliness of newsgathering and the extravagance of duplication, it was equally inevitable
that this should lead to the initial steps for a union of effort.”  Rosewater, supra note 105, R
at 11.
110. Rosewater, supra note 105, at 19–20. R
111. Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 245 (2d. Cir. 1917).
112. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 221 (1918).
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bers.  Yet, the norm against free riding by nonmembers remained infor-
mal, and reputational sanctions began to prove ineffective on their
own.113  Entities began to develop business models entirely around free
riding on the efforts of others.114  The worry thus became that rampant,
systematic free riding could have the effect of interfering with the incen-
tive to join these cooperative arrangements for existing newspapers, but
especially among new entrants.115  Since these arrangements allowed for
a more comprehensive coverage of the news, a free rider now would have
access not just to the efforts of one competitor, but also to the collective
efforts of an entire set of competitors who had pooled their efforts
together.
b. Cooperating Through Tips. — Collective newsgathering thus drew
support from the norms that evolved among newspapers against non-
cooperative free riding on each others’ efforts.  Yet the problem was
more complex.  Even though unimpeded free riding was viewed as prob-
lematic to the cooperative exercise, a good amount of free riding was
nonetheless considered integral to the very manner in which newspapers
obtained their news.  This included using news stories and communica-
tions of a competitor as the starting point for a newspaper’s own story—
i.e., as “tips.”116  Sharing through tips thus became a second form of co-
operation that evolved alongside formalized collective newsgathering.
Only a very specific kind of free riding was likely to impact coopera-
tive newsgathering.  Cooperation would not be harmed by the mere com-
mercial or competitive use of factual news collected by a competitor, but
rather by a competitor doing so without any independent effort of its own
and, by implication, without incurring any costs of its own.  In addition, it
was unclear what amount of effort might be sufficient to legitimize one
newspaper’s use of another’s stories as tips.  Members of the AP were
themselves engaged in a practice known as double-checking, which en-
tailed verifying the story obtained via a tip with their own independent
113. Melville Stone notes that early in his tenure at the Chicago Daily News, he would
lay traps to catch and expose such free riding.  On one such occasion, he recalls that a
competitor engaging in such free riding was “laughed to death” on exposure, and that
within two years of the hoax/trap, it went out of business.  Stone, supra note 40, at 63–64. R
Stone also notes that in due course, such traps and hoaxes, while amusing to the public,
came to have little deterrent effect.  Id. at 355.  For a discussion of how the INS, too, was
the target of such a hoax, see Baird, Uneasy Legacy, supra note 9, at 27 & n.44. R
114. Stone, supra note 40, at 355 (describing practices of the Chicago Courier and R
American Press Association).
115. Recently, Wendy Gordon has argued that the Court in International News may
have been sensitive to this concern.  See Wendy J. Gordon, Harmless Use:  Gleaning from
Fields of Copyrighted Works, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2411, 2422–23 (2009) (observing how
Court in International News may have been motivated by desire to avoid harm to “each
organization’s internal structure” and by “thought that if it refused to enjoin the
defendant’s copying, no entity could collect enough fees from the small newspapers to
afford to send out national and overseas correspondents”).
116. See Baird, Uneasy Legacy, supra note 9, at 24 (“AP routinely monitored the R
bulletins of other wire services and used them as a starting point for its own stories.”).
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sources.117  When confirmed as accurate, double-checking did little to al-
ter the content of what a newspaper lifted from a competitor.  Members
of the INS, on the other hand, were notorious for using competitors’
stories as tips and embellishing them with their own, often-fabricated ad-
ditions, such as nonexistent independent correspondents and other crea-
tive variations.118  From a functional point of view, then, differentiating
the use of a competitor’s stories as tips from its use directly in a news story
was fraught with difficulty.
At the same time, failing to maintain this distinction ran the risk of
interfering with the ubiquity of what was an otherwise efficient coopera-
tive practice.  If a good number of newspapers made their profits by
merely reproducing the news stories of others on the pretext of using
them as tips, the industry as a whole might become more reluctant to
engage in such sharing of tips, which would in turn raise the costs of
journalistic investigation within the industry as a whole.119  Systematic
free riding thus threatened not only formalized cooperation but coopera-
tive sharing through the exchange of tips.
In International News, the district court encountered the issue of tips
rather directly.  At trial, the plaintiffs (AP) openly conceded that they
used their competitors’ stories as tips in creating their own stories, but
argued that their use of independent investigative techniques rendered
the practice legitimate.120  Judge Hand was quick to recognize the irony
of this position and observed that any test of independent investigation or
verification would remain necessarily subjective, especially given the
ready availability of modern communication devices.121  He was addition-
ally concerned that forcing such independent verification (by a newspa-
per) for its own sake might often be wasteful, duplicative, and therefore
grotesque.122  The only available solution was, thus, to render all free rid-
ing, whether systematically undertaken or done as part of a tip, actiona-
ble at law.  Judge Hand resisted this, and denied the plaintiff’s claim for
an injunction.
The Second Circuit, however, believed that the distinction (and po-
licing it) was unproblematic.  Observing that there was no difficulty in
117. Id. at 25.
118. Id. at 27; see also Oliver Carlson & Ernest Sutherland Bates, Hearst:  Lord of San
Simeon 54–55 (1936) (observing how William Hearst, owner of INS, had effectively
invented the process of creating news to report it).
119. See Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 47, at 102 (noting that “using tips R
across the board allows all the papers to lower their cost of collecting information, without
destroying the initial incentive to produce information in the first place” provided that
“there is independent investigation of the tip” and “information printed in the story is
obtained through that investigation”).
120. Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 240 F. 983, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (A. Hand, J.).
121. See id. (“In many cases the verification with modern telephonic communication
would be so rapid that the time required for it would in no sense protect the original
gatherer of the news.”).
122. Id.
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distinguishing tips from the “bodily appropriation” of news, it concluded
that:
As a matter of law or rule, it is impossible to say in advance what
measure of investigation or verification must satisfy the censor,
and the law does not seek to compel the vain or impossible.
Doubtless there have been, and will be again, instances where
the asserted or pretended investigation is but an excuse for ap-
propriation, where no reasonable man would believe that any
effort had been made, except to conceal the absence of original
work, but no such case is before us.123
Believing that applying the distinction to the case at hand would pose few
problems, the court concluded that, while copying through tips was “in-
curably journalistic,” when it entailed the bodily taking of news from a
competitor it remained problematic.124  Yet, as Douglas Baird points out,
this was hardly what existed in the case at hand, where the defendants
were quite “content to take the essential facts of an AP story and make up
the rest.”125  There was no such bodily taking to speak of, rendering the
court’s standard inapplicable to the defendant’s very actions.
c. Problems with Property. — When presented with the free rider prob-
lem, the Court in International News could have simply chosen to create a
property right in the news.  Such a right would have undoubtedly had the
effect of deterring harmful free riding.  Yet, it would have also very likely
done more.
If it were structured as a regular in rem interest, good against the
world at large, the right would have generated huge social costs.  Since
such a right might operate to preclude any transmission or communica-
tion of factual news by members of the public, it would stifle free speech
and the everyday dissemination of news and information.  The potential
social costs of monopoly that might accompany such a move clearly cau-
tioned against its ready acceptance.
This problem could have been easily solved by relaxing the assump-
tion about the in rem nature of the entitlement.  If the property right
were rendered operational only against competitors, the social costs of
the regime would be alleviated to a large extent while preserving its deter-
rent effects on free riding.  The traditional understanding of International
News is that this is indeed the only move that Justice Pitney made when he
created the idea of quasi-property.126  In this understanding, misappro-
priation created a relational property interest, but a property interest
nonetheless.  Misappropriation, however, did more than this, a reality
123. Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 247–48 (2d Cir. 1917).
124. Id. at 247, 253.
125. Baird, Uneasy Legacy, supra note 9, at 27. R
126. See Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 47, at 113–14 (“Pitney describes the R
defendant’s interest in its news as ‘quasi property,’ which is good only for a short period of
time (less than a day) and then only against the direct competitor of the plaintiff . . . .”).
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that lies at the heart of the unfair competition analysis, which is all too
often overlooked.
In the Court’s understanding, free riding was problematic because it
allowed a competitor to lower its costs and compete on unfair terms with
a collector of the news.  All the same, forcing each newspaper to collect
the news individually on its own was recognized to be wasteful, duplica-
tive, and prohibitively expensive, for all but the largest incumbents.  The
cooperative practice of newsgathering that had evolved in the industry
thus needed to be preserved.  Justice Pitney’s observation at the very be-
ginning of his discussion is telling:
[B]y reason of the enormous expense incident to the gathering
and distribution of such news, the only practical way in which a
proprietor of a newspaper can obtain the same is, either
through co-operation with a considerable number of other
newspaper proprietors in the work of collecting and distributing
such news, and the equitable division with them of the expenses
thereof, or by the purchase of such news from some existing
agency engaged in that business.127
Equally important to the Court was preserving the practice of coop-
erative sharing independent of collective newsgathering, i.e., the use of
tips.  The Court readily accepted the argument that such sharing (of tips)
was ubiquitous within the world of journalism.  In this scenario, a prop-
erty right against competitors that originated in mere first possession
(i.e., vested in the first to acquire the news) would have presented intrac-
table problems of determining in whom the rights were vested.  Distin-
guishing between the first to collect and report a piece of news, and a
competitor who scrapes the former’s news instead of collecting it inde-
pendently, would have been a near-impossible task given the collective
newsgathering processes that were already in place.  The determination
would have been further complicated by the widespread practice of shar-
ing tips.128  A first-possession-based property right would have had to dif-
ferentiate between independent collection, collection based on a tip, and
factual scraping, with only the last being the basis for any liability.  It
might have, thus, resulted in potentially endless controversy and confu-
sion within the industry itself, where the line between cooperation and
exclusivity was (and is) somewhat unclear.
Another way of understanding the effects of such a property right is
in terms of the information costs it might have generated for participants.
A possessory right of this form would have raised the costs of measuring
the existence and scope of such rights for any newsgatherer who might
come to acquire newsworthy information.  Since the holder of the right is
unlikely to bear these costs itself, such costs would operate as negative
information externalities, the basis for the common law’s reluctance to
127. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 231 (1918).
128. Id. at 243–44 (discussing industry practice of using tips).
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create altogether new property rights where none existed before, under
the numerus clausus principle.129
Additionally, one detects in the Court’s opinion a deep concern with
the effects of superimposing a regime of individual ownership on an in-
dustry that had until then governed news collection as a common pool
resource.  Referring to the news as a form of common property130 among
newspapers, as an item of publici juris,131 and as stock in trade little sus-
ceptible to absolute ownership,132 the misappropriation strategy seemed
consciously directed at retaining the public domain nature of factual
news.  The traditional Demsetzian understanding of the evolution of
property no doubt posits that such rights emerge from situations where a
resource is initially held as a commons, but the possibility of internalizing
greater benefits results in a gradual abandonment of this feature.133
Elinor Ostrom, by contrast, argues that in numerous situations partici-
pants do not readily abandon holding a resource in common pool while
attempting to extract value from it, but instead choose to develop govern-
ance structures to regulate and deter free riders and ensure an efficient
allocation of the resource among participants.134  In the intangible (i.e.,
intellectual property) context, such common pool arrangements can in-
volve participants pooling their property rights together to minimize
transaction costs and achieve organizational efficiency.135  Alternatively,
participants can pool their efforts—prior to any legal recognition of
property rights in their individual contributions—to achieve an efficient
outcome.136  The latter type of pooling arrangement emerged as the
common practice in the newspaper industry.  The cooperation among
participants that had emerged was directed at collectively producing the
129. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 83, at 26–34 (arguing R
that concern with information cost externalities lies at root of numerus clausus principle).
Merrill and Smith argue that the Court in International News violated the numerus clausus
principle by choosing to create what was in effect a property right.  Id. at 19.  Yet if the
roots of the misappropriation doctrine are thought to lie in unjust enrichment instead, the
Court did in fact adhere to the common law’s numerus clausus.
130. International News, 248 U.S. at 235.
131. Id. at 234.
132. Id. at 236.
133. For the classic articulation of this argument, see generally Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967).
134. See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons:  The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action 12–18 (1990) (describing governance as alternative to property-based
privatization).
135. For a detailed discussion of this type of pool arrangement in the intellectual
property context, described as a “private liability rule organization,” see Robert P. Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1293, 1303 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks 338–44 (2006) (discussing these
approaches and identifying examples); Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons
in the Cultural Environment, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 657, 691–92 (2010) (identifying these
types of common pool arrangements of intellectual property as “solutions to collective
action, coordination, or transaction cost problems”).
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very resource in question—timely, comprehensive news—rather than
pooling together preexisting rights in an intangible resource and ad-
ministering them collectively.
A driving force behind this cooperation had until this point in time
been the nonexcludability of factual news, coupled with newspapers’ rec-
ognition that comprehensiveness (in addition to timeliness) in coverage
produced additional revenue.  Cooperation was also predicated in some
ways on the value of participants’ individual contributions never being
measured and compared inter se.  A possession-based ex ante property
right ran the risk of altering this practice, and with it the intricate govern-
ance mechanisms that the industry had come to develop around undiffer-
entiated news.  A property regime would impose a new set of transaction
costs, which might have altered, at the very least, the structure of the
cooperative arrangement among industry participants.
Finally, there was a rather obvious reason why the Court might have
chosen not to adopt a first-possession-based property regime.  The parties
to the dispute were both news cooperatives that did not necessarily them-
selves collect the news that they supplied to their members.137  They re-
lied on news collected by individual members, which they then retrans-
mitted to the remaining members.  Strictly speaking, a possessory right
might not have benefited the plaintiff in the case at all, even if it were
recognized, unless a differentiation could be made between news stories
(copied by the defendant) that it had collected on its own, rather than
merely retransmitted.138
The Court’s approach in International News was thus far from di-
rected at reaffirming the norm against free riding by granting a property
right.  It did not answer the question of property in news in the affirma-
tive, as Richard Epstein argues it did.139  Instead, the Court chose to by-
pass the issue in favor of an alternative framework, which allowed the
Court to situate free riding within the broader context of newsgathering
and the governance regimes that newspapers had come to develop in that
context as well.
137. See By-Laws of the Associated Press of New York, art. VIII, § 4, reprinted in
Rosewater, supra note 105, app. II at 403 (“[I]n places where the Corporation has no R
correspondent the members shall supply the news required to be furnished by them in
such a manner as may be required by the Board of Directors.”).
138. For an early identification of this problem, see Comment, The Associated Press
Case, 28 Yale L.J. 387, 389 n.9 (1919).
139. Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 47, at 112–13.  Epstein’s reading of R
International News is somewhat perplexing.  At the very beginning of the majority opinion,
Justice Pitney made the following observation:  “We need spend no time . . . upon the . . .
question of property in news matter at common law . . . . [Unfair competition] does not
depend upon any general right of property analogous to the common-law right of the
proprietor of an unpublished work to prevent its publication without his consent . . . .”
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234–35 (1918).  Justice Pitney thus clearly
sought to avoid deciding the question of property in news, since his theory did not
necessitate an answer to this question.
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d. Remedying the Unfair Competitive Advantage. — At the substantive
level, the Court in International News rejected a property and ownership
approach to the idea of unfair competition.  Yet when it moved to reme-
dying the unfair competition, the Court rather summarily affirmed the
remedy chosen by the lower court, i.e., an injunction.140  Nowhere did it
discuss the reasons for this remedy or why ordinary relief, i.e., damages,
might be inadequate.  Courts using the misappropriation doctrine since
have presumed that no measure of damages will suffice to remedy the
unfair competition, on the assumption that the Court in International
News made a considered decision in affirming the injunction.
However, there are good reasons to believe that the Court’s choice
of remedy was selected without any consideration at all.  As Douglas Baird
has convincingly shown, the injunction that the Court affirmed had no
applicability to the parties before it.141  The injunction on appeal (albeit
a preliminary injunction) merely prohibited the defendant from “bodily
taking . . . the words or substance of [the] plaintiff‘s news,” when in fact
the defendant had never engaged in such taking to begin with.142  Even
though the parties eventually settled, the settlement had little effect on
the defendant’s practices, which it presumably viewed as the mere use of
its competitors’ news as tips.143  Just as the injunction had little effect on
the defendant’s actions, so too would it have been of little value in deter-
ring anyone other than uncreative newspapers who lifted their news from
their competitors and did absolutely nothing to it before printing.  To be
effective against a competitor who purported to (even fictitiously) use it
as no more than a tip, the injunction would have had to be developed
into a framework by which to police this practice, which would have, in
turn, extensively interfered with the industry-wide practice.144  Discerning
what remedy the Court might have chosen if it had taken its own theory
seriously thus involves reconstructing a remedial framework derived di-
rectly from the Court’s own logic.
If the basis of liability in misappropriation was not a property inter-
est, but instead the principle of unfair competition, its measure of recov-
ery should ideally be reflective of that principle as well.  In some ways, this
measure seems implicit in the Court’s observation that the “special advan-
140. International News, 248 U.S. at 245–46.
141. Baird, Uneasy Legacy, supra note 9, at 29 & n.50.  Baird also notes that Justice R
Pitney’s opinion for the majority used a hypothetical to describe a case that bore no
resemblance to the facts of the actual dispute.  Id. at 29.
142. Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 253 (2d Cir. 1917).
143. Baird, Uneasy Legacy, supra note 9, at 30.  For a discussion of the defendant’s R
continuing free riding after the decision, see Ferdinand Lundberg, Imperial Hearst:  A
Social Biography 209 (1936).
144. One could argue that the Court was aware of this problem.  Toward the end of
the opinion, it conceded that the injunction might suffer from certain infirmities,
including the possibility of overbreadth.  Yet, it affirmed the injunction on the assumption
that the lower court would determine this question on remand. International News, 248
U.S. at 245–46.
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tage to the defendant in the competition [is] because of the fact that it is
not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering the news” and
therefore a court should “not . . . hesitate long in characterizing it as
unfair competition in business.”145  The unfair competition rationale of
misappropriation connects a plaintiff’s recovery to the amount needed to
restore a competitive equilibrium (i.e., remedy the disadvantage).  A de-
fendant’s liability would in this formulation be the disgorgement of any
unfair cost savings it had obtained by its act of free riding.  This result
would achieve several things—each of which, in fact, ultimately came to
pass.
First, it would deter systematic free riding by new entrants.  By intro-
ducing a legal basis for recovery over and above reputational sanctions, it
would impose new costs on free riders.  The extent of this liability would
now depend on the expenditures incurred in collecting the news copied,
which would in most instances be enormous.  A potential free rider would
thus have every incentive to join a preexisting cooperative, where mem-
bership and the delivery of news entailed significantly lower costs.
One might argue that if deterring free riding was indeed one of the
doctrine’s primary purposes, limiting liability to the disgorgement of a
defendant’s cost savings is likely to prove inadequate.  While this may be
true in the abstract, the common law has long been known to be structur-
ally imperfect when it comes to achieving deterrence, principally because
of its emphasis on connecting any recovery to the actual loss or gain in a
case.146  Accident law, for instance, while attempting to deter careless be-
havior, is forced to tie any recovery to a plaintiff’s actual injury rather
than a level needed to deter a defendant, despite its commitment, at least
in part, to the latter.147  In some instances, the recovery will operate to
deter future careless behavior, but in others it will not, operating in these
situations as a price rather than a sanction.148  The same is equally true
with misappropriation.  Concededly then, in situations where a newspa-
per’s business model is built entirely around free riding on the news col-
lected by others, the measure of recovery will prove to be sufficiently de-
terrent.  At other times, the recovery will be reduced based on the
magnitude of the defendant’s own investment into the news collection
process, thus calling into question its specific, rather than general, deter-
rent effect on free riding.  In these latter situations, introducing an attrib-
utable profits-based measure of recovery, or allowing for the possibility of
145. Id. at 240.
146. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law:  Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801, 1818 & nn.128–129 (1997) (describing structural
tensions in tort doctrine).
147. This limitation is often referred to as the common law’s (or tort law’s) bipolarity
constraint.  See Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 376–82 (1992) (noting disjunction
between economic theories of deterrence and structure of tort law).
148. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1523 (1984)
(“[E]conomists tend to view law as a set of official prices.”).
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punitive damages, might serve to alleviate the concern with under-
deterrence.
Second, a framework that connected liability to cost savings would
also give the informal process of sharing news tips some definition.  It
would enable a defendant to assert at trial that there was indeed no (or
little) cost savings in its copying because it had expended resources of its
own to independently verify the news it copied, i.e., the tips.  Any frame-
work not linked to actual cost savings would run the risk of deterring this
beneficial industry practice as well.
Third, this liability framework would allow existing forms of coopera-
tion to continue.  Since no specific exclusivity would attach to an individ-
ual piece of news, newspapers would still continue to join collective gath-
ering exercises, a practice that was beginning to become the norm within
the industry.149  To the extent that they needed to compete with each
other, this liability framework would force newspapers to differentiate
their content in the marketplace in order to use the copyright system for
genuine exclusionary protection.150
* * *
In functional terms, misappropriation helped solve a collective ac-
tion problem in the newspaper industry.  It added a deterrent for harm-
ful free riding and, at the same time, sought to preserve preexisting coop-
erative practices in the newspaper industry.  The standard account of the
collective action problem posits that in the absence of external incentives,
self-interested wealth-maximizing actors will not find it in their interest to
contribute to the production of goods that benefit the group (or society)
as a whole, but will instead free ride on the contributions and efforts of
others.151  Free riding in the news collection market generates a negative
externality:  harm to newsgathering, a collective rather than individual
harm.  Misappropriation attempted to remedy that harm by negating its
effects, represented in the defendant’s gain.  This account is different
from the traditional intellectual property response to a public goods
problem—that intellectual property, as an exclusionary entitlement, pro-
vides actors with an individualized incentive to create a unique public
149. This intuition also tracks arguments about when liability rules are likely to be
better than property rules at inducing a bargain between parties.  See Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:  Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade,
104 Yale L.J. 1027, 1065 (1995) (observing untailored damages have information-forcing
quality that makes them best suited to incentivizing bargaining); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:  An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
713, 719–20 (1996) (observing that when courts are uncertain about exact magnitude of
harm but impose damages based on their “best estimate” that are “correct on average,”
liability rules are superior to property rules in forcing a bargain).
150. Indeed, after the Court’s decision in International News, the AP changed its
practices to differentiate its content from those of its competitors.  See Baird, Uneasy
Legacy, supra note 9, at 31. R
151. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 1–3 (1965).
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good.  In traditional intellectual property (i.e., patent and copyright), the
law’s ability to attach the entitlement to a uniquely identifiable resource
provides this individual incentive.  In news collection, by contrast, the in-
centive is not an individual one, but a collective one.  Additionally, the
nature of the resource makes it nearly impossible to assign unique entitle-
ments to it.  A property right would thus result in a full-blown monopoly,
with enormous social costs.152
This account of news collection is, by and large, just as true today as
it was at the turn of the twentieth century.  If anything, its significance has
grown.  Membership of daily newspapers in the AP, the country’s leading
cooperative, illustrates this.  In 1918, the AP’s membership consisted of
about 38% of all the daily newspapers published in the country.153  By
1945, this had increased to 68%, but by 2005 it rose to about 99–100%.154
These numbers are no doubt partially due to the collapse of the AP’s
competitors,155 yet they nonetheless point to the continuing importance
of cooperative efforts in the industry.
The doctrine of misappropriation is thus rooted in the realities of
the newspaper industry and arose in an effort to preserve the practices of
cooperation and sharing that were characteristic of the newsgathering
process.  Rather than create a property right in the news, its focus was on
eliminating the unfair competitive advantage a free riding newspaper ob-
tained by lifting news stories from a competitor without incurring any
expense of its own.  Its structural vehicle for this task was the common law
of unjust enrichment, which it used to treat a defendant’s gain as a useful
proxy for the harm incurred.
152. For example, if individuals had to pay newspapers for every use of factual
information, the net effect would be to deter the free dissemination of information among
individuals, producing enormous inefficiencies.  Though sympathetic to property rights in
news, even Epstein characterizes such a result as “grotesque.”  Epstein, Custom and Law,
supra note 47, at 113. R
153. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 229 (1918) (indicating AP
consisted of about 950 daily newspapers in 1918); id. at 248 & n.1 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(noting in 1918 there were 2,500 papers published in the United States).
154. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1945) (stating AP had over
1,200 newspapers as members in 1945); Associated Press, FAQs, at http://www.ap.org/
pages/about/faq.html#2 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 11, 2011)
(indicating AP “serves 1,700 newspapers”); Pew Research Ctr., Project for Excellence in
Journalism, Number of U.S. Daily Newspapers, 5 Year Increments, 1940–2005 (2007), at
http://www.journalism.org/node/1134 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting
there were 1,749 daily newspapers in 1945 and 1,452 in 2005).  In addition to the general
growth of cooperative newsgathering, these numbers also reflect the growing importance
of AP vis-à-vis other news cooperatives that have since ceased to exist, such as the INS and
the United Press International (UPI).
155. See Schwarzlose, supra note 109, at 158–61 (describing how INS and UPI, AP’s R
main competitors, eventually merged and then collapsed).
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B. Unjust Enrichment as the Structural Basis of Misappropriation
Outside of tort, property, and contract law, the common law has long
recognized a fourth category of entitlements that originated independent
of fault, ownership, and consent.  Structured around the principle of un-
just enrichment, these entitlements allow a plaintiff to recover in situa-
tions where a defendant benefits at the plaintiff’s expense without suffi-
cient justification.156  To be sure, scholars continue to debate the precise
contours of the principle and its coherence as an independent organiz-
ing idea.157  Nonetheless, the general consensus today appears to be that
at the very least, it presents the common law with a basis for identifying
an independent set of normative principles revolving around the idea of
gain-based liability.158  Most notably, the American Law Institute’s adop-
tion of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
seems to indicate the growing legitimacy of unjust enrichment as a viable
and independent common law framework for certain entitlements.159
Unjust enrichment is commonly associated with the paradigm case
of recovery for the mistaken payment of a nonexistent debt.160  Charac-
terized by strict liability, without any inquiry into the motives or intent of
either party, the law remains concerned principally, if not exclusively,
with remedying the distributive implications of the defendant’s actions.
Restitution of the benefit obtained is deemed the default corrective rem-
edy, but as Birks emphasizes, restitution represents a remedial response,
156. In England, the principle of unjust enrichment is usually traced back to the
opinion of Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.), though
as an idea many trace it back to Roman law.  See D.J. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to
the Law of Obligations 264 (1999) (tracing foundations of unjust enrichment to Roman
law); Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment,
25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 297, 310–11 (2005) (describing Moses v. Macferlan).
157. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution 11–12 (2004)
[hereinafter Dagan, Law and Ethics] (critiquing dominant role of unjust enrichment in
American restitution law); Steve Hedley, Restitution:  Its Division and Ordering 200 (2001)
(describing “rise[ ] and fall[ ]” of unjust enrichment theory in American law); G.H.L.
Fridman, Unjust Enrichment (Dis)Contented, in Understanding Unjust Enrichment 35,
35 (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds., 2004) (“[I]t is open to question whether the concept of
unjust enrichment is indeed a venerable equitable principle.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Dennis Klimchuk, The Normative Foundations of Unjust Enrichment, in
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment 81, 81 (Robert Chambers et
al. eds., 2009) (describing possible justifications for unjust enrichment).
158. See Dagan, Law and Ethics, supra note 157, at 26 (discussing extensive criticism R
of unjust enrichment and suggesting “viewing unjust enrichment as a loose framework as
well as an invitation for a normative inquiry”).
159. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 7, 2010) (“The law of restitution is the law of unjust
enrichment . . . .”).
160. Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment 3 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Birks, Unjust
Enrichment] (“The law of unjust enrichment is the law of all events materially identical to
the mistaken payment of a non-existent debt.”).
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rather than the basis of liability.161  Indeed, the Restatement appears to
accept this position in large measure.162
Liability for unjust enrichment in the common law originates from:
(1) the defendant obtaining a benefit that is (2) at the plaintiff’s expense
and (3) that is recognized to be unjust.163  While it is the third of these
elements that presents the concept of unjust enrichment with its biggest
normative problems in the common law, this is of little concern for our
discussion of misappropriation, since the unjust nature of a misappropri-
ation originates in the law’s identification of a market harm, described
earlier.164  What makes the enrichment unjust in misappropriation thus
originates in the law’s attempt to correct a form of economic harm pecu-
liar to the market for news, rather than the common law’s internal crite-
ria of enrichment and loss.165
It is also crucial at this juncture to distinguish between instances of
unjust enrichment and wrongful enrichment.  Wrongful enrichment, as
the phrase indicates, refers to an enrichment that a defendant obtains
from an act that constitutes a wrong independent of the enrichment.166  An
economic gain from an independently tortious act, such as a conversion
or a fraud, is an instance of a wrongful enrichment.  Wrongful enrich-
ment is thus a subcategory within the law of torts and is hardly indepen-
dent of it.  Whereas the causative event that triggers liability in a wrongful
enrichment remains a wrong (i.e., a tort) that then gives rise to a gain, an
unjust enrichment, on the other hand, is never triggered by a wrong but
arises independent of it.  In other words, the very enrichment of the de-
fendant, as opposed to a wrongful action resulting in such enrichment,
triggers recovery.167  Discussions of unjust enrichment and restitution law
161. Id. at 16.
162. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 7) (“The use of the word ‘restitution’ to describe the cause of action
as well as the remedy is likewise inherited from the original Restatement, despite the
problems this usage entails.”).
163. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 160, at 39.  Birks identifies two more R
questions, relating to the nature of the remedial right that the plaintiff acquires and
possible defenses that a defendant could invoke.  Id.  I omit these from the analysis for
now, since they go less to liability and more to the issue of response.
164. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing market harm resulting from free riding).  See
generally Mitchell McInnes, Resisting Temptations to Justice, in Philosophical Foundations
of the Law of Unjust Enrichment, supra note 157, at 100, 101 (“American courts regularly R
have manipulated the principle of unjust enrichment in the service of ‘higher’ ends . . . .”).
165. Indeed, even Peter Birks, an ardent defender of the internal logic of the
common law’s requirement that the benefit be unjust, concedes that certain instances of
restitution are policy-motivated insofar as they deviate from the traditional approach to
identifying an enrichment as unjust.  The traditional approach bases restitution on criteria
internal to the plaintiff-defendant relationship.  Birks, Restitution, supra note 84, at 294. R
166. See Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 Tex. L. Rev.
1767, 1783 (2001) (arguing for need to distinguish the two ideas).
167. Id. at 1789 (“Liability in unjust enrichment has in principle nothing whatsoever
to do with fault.”).
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often fail to make this distinction.  However, it remains rather important
to appreciate this distinction in relation to hot news misappropriation.
The misappropriation doctrine can be understood as built around
the structural principle of unjust enrichment.  This section explains the
central elements of this unappreciated reality.  It first examines how mis-
appropriation overcomes the common law’s traditional refusal to allow
recovery for a self-interested conferral of benefits on others.168  It then
proceeds to analyze how the identification of a benefit169 and a corre-
sponding loss,170 both elements of the law of unjust enrichment, apply to
misappropriation.
1. Self-Interested Recovery and the Logic of Collective Action. — Some may
object that the misappropriation doctrine does not originate in the com-
mon law rules of unjust enrichment because the common law has long
recognized an exception to recovery in cases that involve a self-serving
conferral of a benefit.  Where one party undertakes an activity in his or
her own self-interest and in the process confers an incidental benefit on
another, the law disallows recovery.171  Referred to as the rule against
volunteers, officiousness, self-serving, or incidental benefits, its rationale
is twofold.172  The first aspect of the rationale is that the benefit provider
is always in a position to bargain with the beneficiary ex ante, and his
failure to do so ought to inure to the beneficiary’s benefit rather than to
the benefit provider, in order to maintain the long-term market for such
benefits.  Under this so-called market encouragement explanation, the
rule is thought to facilitate the creation of thick markets, composed of
multiple active participants.173  Allowing a provider to recover encour-
ages participants to avoid bargaining ex ante, resulting in supercompeti-
tive prices and, in turn, producing an inefficient allocation of re-
sources.174  The second aspect of the rationale is the theory of free
choice—the idea that a defendant should be in control of his own affairs,
168. See infra Part II.B.1.
169. See infra Part II.B.2.
170. See infra Part II.B.3.
171. See 2 George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution § 10.1 (1978) (“[T]he fuller
meaning of the word [volunteer] can be understood only against the background of a
long-standing judicial reluctance to encourage one person to intervene in the affairs of
another . . . .”); Dawson, supra note 86, at 1409 (“The antipathy . . . in our law of restitution R
toward intermeddlers who confer unsolicited benefits . . . is addressed almost equally to
altruists and self-seekers.”); John D. McCamus, The Self-Serving Intermeddler and the Law
of Restitution, 16 Osgoode Hall L.J. 515, 518–19 (1978) (“[T]he restitutionary entitlement
of the self-interested intermeddler has only received sporadic and precarious
recognition.”).
172. McCamus, supra note 171, at 518–19.  Indeed, the Restatement now mentions R
the rule.  See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 23 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2002).
173. Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65, 79–80 (1985).
174. Id.
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and that forcing him to pay for a benefit that he did not have the chance
to refuse impinges on his autonomy.175
Commercial newsgathering clearly fits the description of a self-
serving activity that incidentally benefits competitors.  A newspaper, in
gathering the news, is indeed trying to benefit its own bottom line
through sales and advertising revenue, but in so doing confers a benefit
on competitors.  Thus, it appears that unjust enrichment in the common
law and misappropriation seem to be at odds with each other.  Wendy
Gordon argues that the logic underlying the common law’s exception to
recovery for such behavior has limited application to intellectual prop-
erty.176  According to her, the market encouragement thesis is actually
better served by a rule of positive liability rather than one of no liability
for self-serving benefits, when it comes to intangibles.177  In intellectual
property situations, she argues, defendants are in a better situation than
plaintiffs to commence an ex ante bargain, which they would have little
incentive to do in a system of no liability.178  In such situations, a regime
that allows recovery even though the benefit may be self-serving may thus
facilitate thick markets, by giving differentiated defendants the incentive
to negotiate with a benefit provider for uses.179
The original market encouragement explanation however remains
premised on an important assumption.  This is the belief that encourag-
ing an ex ante market for the benefit being produced and the allocation
that it results in, is unlikely to generate any independent distortionary
effects and social costs that might possibly outweigh the benefits of the
market-based allocation.  In situations where the possibility of such distor-
tions remains real, encouraging a market for the benefit being produced
ceases to remain independently desirable.  An ex ante market might thus
be a poor fit for an area of activity to begin with, in which case the market
encouragement idea loses much of its explanatory appeal.  The Court in
International News too seemed to be aware of this, when it decided against
recognizing a first-possession-based tradable property right in the
news.180  The solution to the common law’s puzzle of denying recovery
175. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 23 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 2) (describing this idea in terms of “transactional autonomy”); Birks,
Restitution, supra note 84, at 115. R
176. Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits:  Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual
Property, 21 J. Legal Stud. 449, 471–77 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, Harms and Benefits].
Gordon builds this argument around Levmore’s market encouragement idea.  See id. at
453 n.12 (“[T]his article builds on, rather than repudiates, Levmore’s analysis.”).
177. Id. at 472 (“[I]n the intellectual-property setting, giving creators restitutionary
rights tends to encourage consensual markets.”).
178. Id. at 473.
179. Id. at 477.
180. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (“It is not to be
supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered Congress ‘to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries’ (U.S. Const.
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for a self-serving conferral of a benefit, as it relates to hot news misappro-
priation must therefore be found elsewhere.
The answer to this puzzle lies instead in looking a little deeper into
the structure of the common law rule and the exceptions that have long
accompanied it.  One of the few exceptions commonly invoked against
the general rule is the principle of shared or collective interests.  A party
who protects or preserves a shared interest and incurs expenses necessary
to that end, without the prior consent of the others with whom the inter-
est is shared, is nonetheless allowed to recover from them.181  Although
the exception originated in scenarios of co-ownership and co-tenancies, it
has since been extended to other situations where a community of inter-
ests manifests itself in analogous fashion—such as the relationship be-
tween shareholders in a corporation or bondholders in a mutual fund,
and situations involving other common funds.182
The logic underlying the exception derives from a collective action
problem.  John Dawson recognized this early on, and connected the ex-
ception to the idea of free riders and the law’s recognition of the need
for coercion to solve the problem of collective action.183  In some situa-
tions, preserving a community of interests among individuals by ensuring
their concerted action requires nullifying the possibility of free riders.
Thus an individual in a situation of co-ownership needs to weigh the cost
of an action that is likely to benefit all the owners not just against his
personal benefit but also against that of the entire collective.  Enabling
art. 1, § 8, cl. 8), intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a
historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.”).
181. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 24 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2002); Dagan, Law and Ethics, supra note 157, at 125–26 (explaining R
justification for Restatement rule); Daniel Friedmann, Unjust Enrichment, Pursuance of
Self-Interest, and the Limits of Free Riding, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 831, 855–57 (2003)
[hereinafter Friedmann, Unjust Enrichment] (explaining “community of interests”
concept, where plaintiff’s reimbursement “is predicated [on] the existence of a plaintiff’s
interest and a reasonable expenditure he made in order to protect his interest in
circumstances where the expenditure must also necessarily protect the interest of
others. . . . There must also be a sufficient proximity between the interests involved”).
182. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 163 (1939) (finding it
within power of court of equity to order bondholders to reimburse litigant who brought a
claim against a collapsing bank that permitted her fellow bondholders to subsequently
bring their claims as well); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532–33 (1881) (“[W]here
one of many parties having a common interest in a trust fund, at his own expense takes
proper proceedings to save it from destruction and to restore it to the purposes of the
trust, he is entitled to reimbursement . . . .”); United Carolina Bank v. Caroprop, Ltd., 446
S.E.2d 415, 416–17 (S.C. 1994) (holding plaintiff who made mortgage payments and paid
“past-due real estate taxes” on behalf of cotenant was entitled to reimbursements);
Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2), (1975) 1 Q.B. 373, 391 (Lord Denning M.R.) (Eng.) (stating
minority shareholder in derivative action entitled “to be indemnified by the company
against all costs and expenses reasonably incurred by him” while acting on company’s
behalf).  For a discussion of this extension and its logic, see Friedmann, Unjust
Enrichment, supra note 181, at 857–58. R
183. See Dawson, supra note 86, at 1414 (linking shared interest exception to Mancur R
Olson’s writings on collective action problem).
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him to divide up these costs on an equitable basis among all the co-
owners ex post is thought to incentivize his collectively beneficial action
ex ante.184  Indeed, the Restatement too recognizes this collective action
logic in similar terms, but refuses to extrapolate it into a generic principle
when the interest is not shared, strictly speaking, but is nonetheless re-
lated.185  In a situation of shared interests (i.e., a community of interests),
the interconnectedness of self-interest and the conferral of benefits is also
thought to be unlikely to result in a double incentive problem.  Thus, it is
not just the possibility of free riding that the rule addresses, but the in-
centives to maintain the equilibrium that preexists the expenditure.186
In other words, when the collective benefit is threatened by free riding,
the law allows recovery to ensure its continued production.187  As a
framework to overcome the collective action problem in newsgathering
described earlier, misappropriation finds its basis to overcome the com-
mon law’s reluctance to allow a recovery for self-interested conferral of
benefits upon others.
The starting point for the analysis was the recognition that informa-
tion (e.g., news) gathered by a party is at all times a part of the public
domain—the information commons.  This proposition was taken as a
given by the Court in International News.188  Nonetheless, structurally it
remains a collective resource in the sense that newspapers depend en-
tirely on it for their business.  Newsgatherers thus have a community of
interests amongst themselves, not in the formal ownership sense, but
rather in the sense that they collectively depend on the timely and accu-
rate collection of news, and they all have immediate access to it once it is
collected and disseminated.  It forms their collective stock in trade.189
While news may be in the commons, its continuing existence and vitality
as a valuable resource depends on its being gathered appropriately by
184. Consider the situation of four equal co-owners of a piece of land.  Each of them
earns an annual rent of $4,000 from the land.  Now, assume that a situation arises where
the entirety of the rental income (the total $16,000) comes under threat (for example,
because of failure to fulfill a regulatory requirement), which requires one of them to act in
a timely manner to save the income in its entirety for a given year.  Assume that this action
costs an individual co-owner $5,000.  If a co-owner believes that his expenditure of this
amount (the cost) is to be weighed only against his own benefit, he would have little
incentive to pay that amount.  On the other hand, if he knows that he can spend this
money upfront and then eventually recover it from his co-owners on an equal basis, the
benefits (the rental income of $4,000) exceed the prorated cost ($1,250).  This incentive
makes it likely that he will spend the $5,000 in order to preserve the group’s total rental
income of $16,000.
185. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 23 cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 2).
186. For a discussion of this phenomenon in similar incentive terms, see Dagan, Law
and Ethics, supra note 157, at 131–36. R
187. Id. at 133–35.
188. See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text (noting that Court in R
International News recognized news as “common property”).
189. See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. R
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)).
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those who rely on it for their commercial sustenance.  Newspapers’ self-
interest is thus inextricably linked to their collective interest.
The proximity, or community of interests, between market partici-
pants to produce a public domain collective good—the collection of
news—is thus the solution to the puzzle.  It might at first seem odd to
characterize the interests of marketplace competitors (i.e., newspapers)
as proximate or as forming a community.  Yet, if one adopts a functional
approach to these categories, and recognizes that they originate in the
idea of the interests being intertwined—either by legal or factual neces-
sity—an appropriate analogy begins to emerge.190  The inseparability of
the intrinsic and incidental benefits from the process defines the func-
tional approach, and news collection, where the resource (i.e., the news)
lacks a priori exclusionary entitlement, admits rather well of this
categorization.191
It bears emphasizing that connecting the misappropriation doctrine
to the common law’s logic of solving a collective action problem reveals
that liability (and recovery) is triggered not by any wrongdoing, but by
the very act of enriching the defendant.  In other words, free riding in
situations where the law seeks to solve a collective action problem
through recovery is not treated by the law as an independent wrong; but
rather as a distributive consequence that merits correcting ex post.
2. The Benefit and the Problem of Subjective Devaluation. — At first
glance, the idea of a benefit seems largely self-explanatory.  Situations
that increase the net wealth of a defendant, or, put more abstractly, that
enhance the defendant’s overall welfare, may be considered situations
190. It is worth noting that some jurisdictions adopt a strictly formalist approach to
the idea of a community of interests, requiring that the obligations be interconnected by
necessity of law rather than fact.  Lord Goff of Chieveley & Gareth Jones, The Law of
Restitution 381 (2002) (observing that there must be “compulsion of law” for collective
interests exception to apply).  Even under such a regime, one might argue that the
collective good element of news collection is indirectly demanded by law because the law
denies private ownership of the resource and forces it to be placed in the public domain.
191. Indeed, numerous U.S. courts, unlike other common law jurisdictions, seem to
have adopted this functionalist approach to the collective interests exception.  See Ford v.
United States, 88 F. Supp. 263, 264 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (holding U.S. entitled to reimbursement
from army private for paying off money he stole from Englishman because U.S. was not
“acting as a volunteer” but had “assumed liability for certain acts” of members of military in
part to “preserve the safety and effectiveness of [American] forces”); Love v. Robinson, 137
So. 499, 499–500 (Miss. 1931) (holding bank superintendent entitled to reimbursement
from stockholders where he advanced depositors amount owed by insolvent bank without
waiting for “slow process of the collection of the stockholders’ liability” because, although
he was not legally required to pay, he had “active interest or concern in the nature of a
definite managerial responsibility” in relation to bank’s debts); Boney v. Cent. Mut. Ins.
Co., 197 S.E. 122, 126 (N.C. 1938) (holding insurance broker entitled to reimbursement
by insurance company where broker settled tort claim of client after insurance company
wrongly claimed client’s policy did not cover suit, because “payment made under a moral
obligation . . . or under an erroneous impression of one’s legal duty, is not a voluntary
payment”); see also 2 Palmer, supra note 171, § 10.5 (discussing functionalist approach R
taken by Ford, Love, and Boney).
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where a defendant obtains a benefit.  All the same, identifying a benefit
necessitates choosing an appropriate baseline.192  This is especially prob-
lematic in the context of intangibles, where the benefits are nonrivalrous
(i.e., they can be utilized by an unlimited number of users at the same
time) and nonexcludable (i.e., users cannot be prevented from utilizing
the resource).  In these situations, the tendency of the law, driven by an
economic approach to property, has been to characterize the failure to
singularly internalize all such benefits as a harm worth remedying using a
tort-like rule.193  Unjust enrichment, by contrast, insists that the law focus
not on the failure of such complete internalization by the plaintiff, but
instead on the consequences of its internalization by the defendant.
The baseline problem is thus one of determining the right valua-
tional perspective to adopt for the analysis.194  In other words, whose per-
spective should the law adopt in determining whether a plaintiff’s actions
resulted in a benefit to the defendant?  One obvious approach is an ob-
jective, reasonable person standard.195  However, on occasion, a defen-
dant may deny that the plaintiff’s actions resulted in any independent
benefit.  Rather than being strategic, such a denial might legitimately
originate in the defendant having adopted a different baseline from that
of the plaintiff in making the assessment.  This phenomenon is referred
192. For an early identification of this problem, see Gordon, Harms and Benefits,
supra note 176, at 451. R
193. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright
Law, 3 Rev. L. & Econ. 649, 650–51 (2007) (noting copyright law confirms Demsetz’s thesis
that “private property rights . . . emerge to enable the internalization of externalities”);
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257, 257 (2007)
(“Economists since Demsetz have viewed property rights as a way to internalize the
external costs and benefits one party’s action confers on another . . . [because] if a party
didn’t capture the full social value of her actions she wouldn’t have optimal incentives to
engage in those actions.”).
194. Traditionally, unjust enrichment and restitution law have treated this problem as
going to the very basis of liability.  Intriguingly, the new Restatement treats it largely as a
matter of measurement.  Since the focus of this Article is largely on the justificatory
structure of misappropriation, rather than on unjust enrichment doctrine as such, this
right-remedy distinction is of little significance here.  See Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 49 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (noting
although restitution formula sometimes phrased as “ ‘subjective value to the
recipient[,]’ . . . [t]he word ‘subjective’ is potentially misleading . . . because subjective
values are often values that are incapable of measurement . . . [and] [r]estitution does
not . . . impose a liability in money for any enrichment that cannot be valued in money
with reasonable confidence”).
Echoes of the other elements discussed in this section—namely the concepts of free
acceptance, incontrovertible benefit, and the like—are found in other parts of the
Restatement, focusing on specific types of unjust enrichment.  See, e.g., Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 9 (Discussion Draft 2000) (discussing
conferral of nonmonetary benefits by mistake).
195. See Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 160, at 50 (“The courts have no choice R
but to deal in market value . . . .”); Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution
64–65 (2d ed. 2006) (giving four reasons objective test should be considered first).
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to as a subjective devaluation.196  The rationale for allowing this is that in
some situations the defendant may not have even recognized that he was
getting a benefit from the plaintiff.  Since unjust enrichment is premised
on the actual, identifiable receipt of a benefit, in situations where a de-
fendant neither requested nor had the opportunity to refuse such a bene-
fit, the common law avoids imposing liability to safeguard a defendant’s
individual autonomy.197  In a misappropriation claim, a defendant may
thus legitimately assert that he had no reason to believe that the informa-
tion (i.e., news) being used was a benefit that originated with the plain-
tiff, as opposed to information that made its way into the public domain
in the ordinary course of things.
As originally understood, the subjective devaluation problem arose
out of concern for a defendant’s autonomy.  Peter Birks’s description of
the problem captures this well, when he notes that “[w]hat matters is [the
defendant’s] choice.  The fact that there is a market in the good which is
in question, or in other words that other people habitually choose to have
it and thus create a demand for it, is irrelevant to the case of any one
particular individual.”198  The problem can be expressed in efficiency
terms as well.  In situations where the value of a good (i.e., the putative
benefit) to a defendant is unknown, that defendant may face a potential
loss if the imposition of liability grossly outweighs the potential benefit to
a plaintiff vested with the entitlement.199  The imposition of liability in
such a scenario would be inefficient.
To overcome the problem posed by a potential subjective devalua-
tion, the common law of unjust enrichment has over the years come to
rely on a fairly well-known technique, often referred to as the incontro-
vertible benefit.200  These are situations where a benefit to the defendant
196. See Birks, Restitution, supra note 84, at 109 (“[Subjective devaluation is] based R
on the premis[e] that benefits in kind have value to a particular individual only so far as he
chooses to give them value.”); Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 160, at 50 (noting R
“subjectivity of the value of non-money benefits”); Virgo, supra note 195, at 67 (noting R
principle of subjective devaluation exists “because different people value different things
according to their own tastes and priorities” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Andrew G. Spence, In Defence of Subjective Devaluation, 43 McGill L.J. 889,
891–93 (1998) (describing and ultimately defending subjective devaluation).
197. See Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co., (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234 at 248 (Eng.) (“The
general principle is . . . that work or labour done or money expended by one man to
preserve or benefit the property of another do not . . . create any obligation to repay the
expenditure.”); see also Virgo, supra note 195, at 68 (discussing Falcke). R
198. Birks, Restitution, supra note 84, at 109. R
199. Dagan, Law and Ethics, supra note 157, at 140 (“Utility most clearly objects to R
restitution where the utility loss to the defendant had she been forced to make restitution
outweighs the gain to the plaintiff from the action which restitution could have
facilitated.”).
200. Birks, Restitution, supra note 84, at 116 (defining incontrovertible benefit as R
situation where “no reasonable man would say that the defendant was not enriched”);
Virgo, supra note 195, at 74 (defining incontrovertible benefit as an “unquestionable R
benefit, a benefit which is demonstrably apparent and not subject to debate or conjecture”
(citing Reg’l Municipality of Peel v. Queen, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 762, 795 (Can.))).
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is clear and manifest from the circumstances such that it can be pre-
sumed that the defendant would not have refused it even when presented
with the choice.201  Saul Levmore argues that the incontrovertible benefit
exception reflects, at base, nothing more than the ease with which the
benefit in question can be translated into wealth.202  In other words, it
offers no more than a test of objective fungibility.  The most common
situation of an incontrovertible benefit is that of the necessary expendi-
ture:  situations where what the defendant obtains saves him from incur-
ring an expenditure, which by the operation of law or facts, he necessarily
would have had to incur anyway.203
Emergency services rendered by a plaintiff, or the supply of necessi-
ties, are typical of this category.  Much does of course turn on classifying
what the defendant receives as necessary or essential.204  The easiest cases
of necessity involve those where a defendant is under a legal duty (e.g., a
debt, or a duty to abate a nuisance), and the plaintiff mistakenly dis-
charges that duty.  Courts have also, however, been more than willing to
look beyond the existence of a formal legal duty, especially in situations
where a benefit is thought essential to the defendant’s very enterprise.205
For instance, the act of bringing the coal to the surface for a coal mine is
typically considered necessary to the operation of the mine, and can form
the basis of a recovery for a necessary expenditure saved on.206
Situations covered by the hot news misappropriation doctrine lend
themselves to the distinct possibility of a subjective devaluation.  In other
words, an enterprise relying on information collected by another, but
placed in the public domain and made publicly available, may legiti-
mately claim that it had no reason to recognize that it was receiving a
benefit from the information gatherer, rather than using publicly availa-
ble information in its own communications.  Indeed, in International
News, the defendant raised the issue of a subjective devaluation, arguing
that the news became the common possession of all once it was published
and made accessible to the public; effectively claiming that no unique
benefit as such had accrued to it, other than that which flowed to the
201. Reg’l Municipality of Peel, [1992] 3 S.C.R. at 795.
202. Levmore, supra note 173, at 77–79 (“[T]he wealth-dependency problem R
disappears and restitution need not be denied where the nonbargained benefit is easily
translated into wealth.”).
203. Virgo, supra note 195, at 75–77 (noting circumstances of necessity may arise “by R
operation of law” or may be “factually necessary”).  The Restatement also recognizes this as
an independent category of recovery.  Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment § 9(1)(d) (Discussion Draft 2000) (allowing recovery when plaintiff’s actions
have spared defendant “an otherwise necessary expense”).
204. See Birks, Restitution, supra note 84, at 120–21 (“Since the necessity for the R
expenditure need not be absolute there is room to choose between either a strict or a
liberal interpretation of the test.”).
205. See Andrew Burrows et al., Cases and Materials on the Law of Restitution 91 (2d
ed. 2007) (“Cases on the wrongful use of the property of another also satisfy the ‘negative’
enrichment aspect if the use of the property is necessary to the defendant’s enterprise.”).
206. Id. at 91 n.1.
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general public.207  The Court responded to this argument by identifying
the defendant’s gain as an incontrovertible benefit.  It proceeded to char-
acterize the activity of newsgathering, and its accompanying costs, as nec-
essary to the enterprise of newspaper publishing.208  Consequently, the
plaintiff’s actions allowed the defendant to save on an expense necessary
to its enterprise, effectively rendering it an incontrovertible benefit.  The
Second Circuit’s formulation of misappropriation as five independent el-
ements follows a similar pattern.  Its explicit recognition that the defen-
dant’s acts of free riding on the plaintiff’s efforts had the effect of lower-
ing the defendant’s necessary costs similarly relied on the idea of an
incontrovertible benefit.209
The process of identifying the defendant’s benefit is also manifest in
the requirement that the value of the information in question derive
from its time-sensitive nature.210  By insisting that the value of the news
(or other protectable information) derive not just from its communica-
tive function but also from its timeliness, the doctrine rather explicitly
identifies the real benefit that a defendant needs to have been enriched
by for the free riding to be actionable.  In other words, when a defendant
free rides on a plaintiff’s newsgathering, the defendant’s enrichment
originates not just in its avoidance of the cost of collecting the news on its
own, but also in its saving on the added expenditure necessary for the
information to remain timely, and therefore valuable.211
3. The Substantive Identification of a Nonproprietary Loss. — In addition
to there being a benefit that enriches the defendant, the benefit needs to
be at the plaintiff’s expense.212  This requirement performs two func-
tions.  First, it operates as a rule of standing, enabling a party impacted by
the enrichment to effect its rectification.  Second, it situates the principle
207. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
208. Id. at 238–39 (noting how material used by defendant had “been acquired by
complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money”
and observing that “novelty and freshness” were central to enterprise of news reporting).
209. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 854 (2d Cir. 1997) (“An
indispensable element of an INS ‘hot-news’ claim is free riding by a defendant on a
plaintiff’s product, enabling the defendant to produce a directly competitive product for
less money because it has lower costs.”).
210. Id. at 852 (noting one of central elements to hot news claim is that “the value of
the information is highly time-sensitive”).
211. By specifying this requirement explicitly, the doctrine thus also hints at the
appropriate time frame to be used in assessing the market value of the benefit—namely at
or shortly after its collection, given the inverse relationship between the information’s
value and the elapse of time thereafter.
212. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2 cmt. a
(Discussion Draft 2000) (describing it as necessary but not sufficient condition for
recovery); Birks, Restitution, supra note 84, at 132 (“[This requirement] signifies only that R
the plus to the defendant is a minus to the plaintiff.”); Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra
note 160, at 73–74 (“[T]he real question is . . . what constitutes a sufficient connection R
between the would-be claimant and the enrichment he wants to claim.”); Virgo, supra note
195, at 105 (noting this requires claimant to “establish a connection between the receipt R
on an enrichment by the defendant and the claimant’s loss”).
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of unjust enrichment around the idea of corrective justice by connecting
the plaintiff and defendant in a bilateral private law setting premised on
the correlativity of normative gain and loss.213  Very importantly, though,
the identification of a loss as a substantive element of the unjust enrich-
ment analysis is different from the calculation of restitutionary damages,
an issue addressed later.214  In other words, unjust enrichment demands
the identification of a loss to establish a claim, but does not necessarily
connect the consequences of such a claim to that loss, once identified.
While the identification of a loss as a substantive matter may seem
simple, its importance cannot be overemphasized, since it is at this junc-
ture that the distinction between a proprietary claim and one originating
in unjust enrichment begin to bleed into one another.  Keeping them
distinct is an exercise that has thus far troubled both scholars of unjust
enrichment and property.
Generally, there are two approaches to identifying when a benefit is
at the expense of a plaintiff.  The first, known as the correspondence ap-
proach, favors recognizing a direct correlation between a defendant’s
benefit and a plaintiff’s loss in order to satisfy the requirement.215  In
other words, the recovery is contingent on the plaintiff showing a mate-
rial loss either equivalent to or greater than the recovery being sought.216
A second approach, by contrast, asks merely whether the benefit in ques-
tion came from or originated with the plaintiff for the requirement to be
satisfied.217  It is this approach that most readily falls back on ownership
ideas for normative traction.  Birks, its leading proponent, argues that
since unjust enrichment is more concerned with remedying a defen-
dant’s benefit than it is with a plaintiff’s impoverishment, it suffices for
the plaintiff to establish that the benefit bears some causal connection to
plaintiff’s actions, even if that connection is not direct or quantifiably
213. For a discussion of the corrective justice basis of unjust enrichment, see Ernest J.
Weinrib, Correctively Unjust Enrichment, in Philosophical Foundations of the Law of
Unjust Enrichment, supra note 157, at 31, 33 (arguing “the parties to liability in unjust R
enrichment . . . establish the correlative right and duty through the interaction in which
they both participate”); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44
Duke L.J. 277, 294–97 (1994) (applying framework of correlativity to understand
normative structure of unjust enrichment law).
214. See infra Part III.B.2 (arguing ideal solution in calculating restitutionary
damages would focus on annulling effects of defendant’s unfair cost savings).
215. See R.B. Grantham & C.E.F. Rickett, Disgorgement for Unjust Enrichment?, 62
Cambridge L.J. 159, 166 (2003) (describing correspondence idea).
216. See, e.g., Mitchell McInnes, “At the Plaintiff’s Expense”:  Quantifying
Restitutionary Relief, 57 Cambridge L.J. 472, 473 (1998) (“As a matter of policy, it makes
perfectly good sense to preclude the plaintiff in a subtractive enrichment case from
recovering more than she lost . . . .”); Mitchell McInnes, The Measure of Restitution, U.
Toronto L.J., Spring 2002, at 163, 172–74 (“In Canadian law, the court must be satisfied
not only that the defendant received an enrichment but also that the plaintiff suffered a
corresponding deprivation.”).
217. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 160, at 75–78 (discussing sufficiency of R
“interceptive subtractions,” where asset moving from third party to claimant is intercepted
by defendant).
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equal to the benefit.218  On closer examination, though, Birks falls back
on the idea of ownership to justify this position.  He thus explains cases
that allow a recovery where a defendant obtains a benefit by using some-
one else’s property without depriving that person of its possession—e.g.,
a stowaway in a ship’s cargo hold—by arguing that they can be under-
stood as relying on the simple logic of “from my property, therefore suffi-
ciently from me,” to establish that the benefit was at the plaintiff’s
expense.219
This noncorrespondence logic thus builds on the normative struc-
ture of property law for its answers.  Since property law generally
presumes that any interference with an ownership interest is actionable
even without a showing of actual harm (injuria sine damno) because of its
injury to the right,220 so too does Birks’s argument for noncor-
respondence.  Absent this logic, his argument has little independent ba-
sis.  Outsourcing the identification of a loss to property law is hardly
unique to Birks though.  The most recent version of the Restatement too
adopts this logic in principle.  In explaining why some conferrals of bene-
fits are recoverable and others are not (i.e., why some are at the expense
of the plaintiff), it notes that “[r]estitution subserves property rights” and
that the benefit in question “must be something as to which the law rec-
ognizes rights of ownership, meaning something the law will protect
against appropriation by others.”221  Yet, when it comes to explaining sit-
uations where it is ambiguous whether the law recognizes an ownership
claim at all, it notes that “[i]n such cases, the availability vel non of the
claim in restitution is a function of applicable property law,” effectively
outsourcing the normative work to the law of property.222
Hanoch Dagan picks up on this point and notes how this outsourc-
ing pays little attention to the contestability of property as a normative
idea and fails to engage the question of whether an ownership interest in
a particular resource ought to be accorded to an individual to begin
218. Peter Birks, “At the Expense of the Claimant”:  Direct and Indirect Enrichment
in English Law, in Unjustified Enrichment 493, 525 (David Johnston & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2002) (“[I]t is not true to say that the defendant’s enrichment must be
directly from the plaintiff, whether interceptively or otherwise.”).
219. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 160, at 82. R
220. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997)
(“Because a legal right is involved, the law recognizes that actual harm occurs in every
trespass. . . . The law infers some damage from every direct entry upon the land of
another.” (citation omitted)).  A notable exception to this rule is the law of trespass to
chattels in the United States.  See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Property Along the Tort
Spectrum:  Trespass to Chattels and the Anglo-American Doctrinal Divergence, 35
Common L. World Rev. 135, 142 (2006) (noting that unlike under English law, “under
American law some actual damage to the chattel is necessary before the action can be
maintained”).
221. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 7, 2010).
222. Id.
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with.223  It thus posits an obvious circularity by claiming that the resource
ought to be recognized as a property interest in order to avoid an unjust
enrichment, the very existence of which depends on the property interest
to begin with.224  Dagan’s point is an excellent explanation for the crystal-
lization of propertarian logic in the misappropriation setting, and the
move from quasi-property in International News to property in hot news.
So, if the noncorrespondence approach depends on proprietary
logic to determine a plaintiff’s detriment, this leaves us with the corre-
spondence approach, which looks for some actual (i.e., quantifiable) loss
to the plaintiff to satisfy the requirement.  Gordon argues that in the mis-
appropriation doctrine, this requirement is satisfied by looking for a
“competitive nexus” between the parties and asking whether the defen-
dant’s copying is in a market that the plaintiff is or will be serving
shortly.225  A loss of potential sales, manifested in this nexus requirement,
is thus taken to satisfy the loss requirement, not because it represents the
harm sustained by the plaintiff,226 but because it connects the plaintiff’s
entitlement to the defendant’s actions, making the defendant’s gain di-
rectly “at the expense of” the plaintiff’s revenue.227  While this formula-
tion no doubt follows the correspondence approach, it at the same time
doesn’t identify a rigid temporal baseline for the quantification of the
plaintiff’s expense/loss, since it effectively allows unrealized future expec-
tancies into the calibration of the entitlement.  This allowance for expec-
tancies, in turn, renders the entitlement susceptible to being seen as per-
fectly compatible with an economically oriented conception of property
rights in intangibles,228 despite Gordon’s conscious efforts to move the
analysis away from the idea of property.229
223. See Dagan, Law and Ethics, supra note 157, at 20–21 (noting “property is an R
essentially contested concept” and “there is no reason to presuppose that any gains derived
from property are necessarily within the entitlement of the property’s owner”).
224. See id. (“[I]t is circular to base a right of restitution on the ground that the
invaded resource is a property interest, where the basis for regarding the resource as
property is that otherwise unjustified enrichment would be permitted.” (citation
omitted)); Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefit Obtained Through the Appropriation
of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 504, 511 n.36 (1980) (“[I]t
may be argued that there is a certain circularity in reasoning in finding a right of
restitution on the ground that the right . . . is a property interest . . . .”).
225. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 34, at 238–39. R
226. Id. at 244 (“The competition requirement might seem to make the restitutionary
right equivalent to a right against harm.  That is not so.”).
227. Id. at 239 (“The competition requirement works to assure that defendant’s gain
is at plaintiff’s expense.”).
228. For discussions of this conception, see Lemley, supra note 32, at 1037–40 R
(identifying development of property rhetoric in intellectual property and observing how it
originates in logic of internalizing positive externalities that may arise in future and
avoiding harmful free riding).
229. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 34, at 245–46 (discussing R
conceptions of property).  Gordon defines “property” rather narrowly for the purposes of
her argument.  See id. at 166 n.60 (“Note that although much of the theoretical literature
employs the term ‘property right in information’ to embrace any legal right to sue, I use
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A more acceptable solution to the problem once again originates in
the identification of newsgathering as a collective good.  In situations
where unjust enrichment allows a plaintiff to recover from a defendant in
order to solve a collective action problem, its core concern is that without
enabling such a recovery, future plaintiffs would be reluctant to produce
the collective good, thereby reducing overall social welfare.  The gain to a
defendant is thus the cost saved by not participating in the production of
the good.  The plaintiff’s loss, which needs to correspond causally to this
gain when the enrichment occurs as a substantive rather than remedial
principle, is thus simply the cost incurred in producing the collective
good—no more, no less.
Thus, when a participant X in a collective fund worth $50,000 spends
$1,000 to safeguard the collective’s interest, and the fund eventually
grows to be worth $500,000—the loss to X that unjust enrichment con-
cerns itself with as a matter of substantive standing has no connection to
the fund’s appreciation, but is restricted to his actual expenditure, i.e.,
the $1,000.  To allow otherwise would render the very existence of the
claim (as opposed to its remedial consequences) subject to market vagar-
ies.  In other words, if X’s loss is identified as $500,000 when the fund
grows, one should see no reason to allow the claim if the fund were to
depreciate in value to $0 eventually.230  Yet, doing so would undermine
the recognition that X did in fact incur an expenditure (and therefore a
net loss) that at one point in time enriched the members of the collec-
tive.  The common law of unjust enrichment thus insists rather dogmati-
cally that the substantive loss be determined at the point that the defen-
dant is enriched, not before or after, and that it be determined
independent of market fluctuations that are causally linked to it.231
For misappropriation, the inclusion of lost sales or profits in the very
identification of a loss has the effect of including an unrealized expecta-
tion in the baseline, rendering the recovery substantively contingent.  In
focusing on the upside of such an inclusion (i.e., an appreciation in
value), scholars tend to ignore the obvious possibility of its downside, ef-
fectively defeating the entire claim.  Unjust enrichment resists this, con-
sciously distinguishing itself from cases of wrongful enrichment.232  Iden-
tifying the plaintiff’s expense in terms of lost sales or profits also has the
effect of unintentionally vindicating a preexisting interest, thereby effec-
tively converting the claim into a proprietary one.  In other words, restitu-
tion for lost profits (i.e., disgorgement) cannot be coherently justified
the term ‘property’ here to embrace the particular set of rights associated in the common
law with ownership, particularly of real property.”).
230. For a fuller discussion, see Grantham & Rickett, supra note 215, at 175. R
231. Id. at 165 (“The claimant’s wealth entitlement is thus defined at the point of
receipt.”).
232. See Friedmann, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 181, at 844 (noting how R
exceptions have nonetheless emerged where liability for unjust enrichment is imposed for
misappropriation of “something to which another person had a mere expectancy”).
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without an a priori basis for allocating the profits to the plaintiff.  In most
instances, a property right or some other control-driven interest performs
this function.233  But when a preexisting interest is absent, the idea of
damages for lost profits has little basis.
Once again, on closer analysis the structure of misappropriation fol-
lows the logic of the common law, consciously deviating from a proprie-
tary conception of loss.  As the court in National Basketball Ass’n observed,
the very first element of the doctrine requires a showing that the plaintiff
collects the information “at some cost or expense.”234  Were the basis of
the action proprietary, clearly no proof of quantifiable loss would be re-
quired, especially given plaintiffs’ recurrent focus on equitable relief.
What accounts for this element then is the doctrine’s unjust enrichment
framework.  As noted previously, the core concern motivating misappro-
priation is the fact that a defendant enhances profitability by saving on
this cost or expense—which represents enrichment.235  Since at the point
of enrichment (i.e., the use of the information by the defendant) this cost
or expense is the only loss actually sustained by the plaintiff, misappropri-
ation requires courts to identify it as a first step in their substantive analy-
sis.  And courts applying the doctrine do indeed take this requirement
seriously.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF A NONPROPRIETARY APPROACH
The distinction between a property-based approach to misappropria-
tion and one rooted in unjust enrichment and unfair competition is
more than just academic, and has several important consequences for the
interpretation, application, and extension of the doctrine.  This Part ad-
dresses these implications.  The nonproprietary approach (1) allows for a
better appreciation of the doctrine’s unique elements, some of which
have thus far been viewed as mere formalities, (2) reins in courts’ discre-
tion in choosing between remedies once the substantive elements of the
doctrine are satisfied, and (3) cabins the doctrine’s potential speech-lim-
iting features under the First Amendment.
233. See Lionel D. Smith, Disgorgement of the Profits of Breach of Contract:
Property, Contract, and “Efficient Breach,” 24 Can. Bus. L.J. 121, 121–22 (1994) (noting
availability of disgorgement for various wrongs, including breach of fiduciary obligation,
breach of confidence, conversion, and trespass to land).  For discussion of the argument
that an interest need not be characterized as “property” for a profits baseline to be
awarded under unjust enrichment, as long as the law seeks to emphasize the plaintiff’s
control over the revenue stream from the resource, see Dagan, Law and Ethics, supra note
157, at 242.  Dagan’s argument interfaces with the issue of appropriate remedial response, R
an issue that is discussed infra Part III.B.
234. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852 (2d Cir. 1997).
235. See supra Part II.A.1.
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A. Making Sense of Doctrinal Anomalies
A large part of the reason why misappropriation has survived federal
preemption under the copyright laws to this day is because of its use of
doctrinal requirements that supposedly cause it to function differently
from traditional copyright law.236  In identifying and emphasizing the ex-
tra elements needed for it to withstand a copyright preemption chal-
lenge, however, few have paid close attention to the structural bases of
these elements and their connection to misappropriation’s underlying
theoretical framework.237  Most of these elements have little connection
to the dominant property-based theory, making them appear as mere for-
malities to overcome a preemption challenge.  A theory of competitive
unjust enrichment provides a better explanation for them.  This section
considers two such elements:  the requirement of direct competition that
is traced back to International News, and the duty to police that recent
interpretations of hot news misappropriation have added to the mix.
1. Direct Competition as Interest Homogeneity. — Of the five elements
needed to satisfy a claim for misappropriation, the one that courts con-
tinue to disagree on is direct competition.  Courts expect a plaintiff in a
misappropriation suit to establish that a defendant’s actions put the de-
fendant “in direct competition with a product or service offered by the
plaintiff.”238  Some also interpret this requirement as necessitating that
the parties compete directly in a primary market.239  Absent such a show-
ing, courts have routinely denied plaintiffs’ recovery altogether.240
Despite its avowed importance, no court has to date offered a mean-
ingful test or approach to applying the requirement.  The dominant ap-
236. Indeed, when the preemption provision of the Copyright Act was enacted,
misappropriation was explicitly recognized to be exempt from its coverage.  See H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748
(“‘Misappropriation’ is not necessarily synonymous with copyright infringement, and thus
a cause of action labeled as ‘misappropriation’ is not preempted if it is in fact based
neither on a right within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 nor on
a right equivalent thereto.”).
237. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 850–53 (discussing extra elements requirement
in relation to hot news misappropriation).
238. Id. at 852; see also Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240 (1918)
(discussing why process at issue amounted to “unfair competition”).
239. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 cmt. c (1995) (“[I]n
most . . . cases in which the misappropriation doctrine has been determinative, the
defendant’s appropriation . . . resulted in direct competition in the plaintiff’s primary
market. . . . Appeals to the misappropriation doctrine are almost always rejected when the
appropriation does not intrude upon the plaintiff’s primary market.”).
240. See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1041
(3d Cir. 1984) (holding plaintiff had no legally protectable interest and denying injunction
where there was no “direct competition”); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Ideal Publ’g
Corp., 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 761, 761–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding no actionable
misappropriation where defendant produced “collateral product”); Nat’l Football League
v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977) (finding no misappropriation
where defendant uses information to profit from “demands for collateral services”).
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proach appears to involve courts adopting a largely intuitive understand-
ing of both direct competition and the primary market that the parties
operate in.241  Most courts focus entirely on the parties’ products or ser-
vices being offered, and upon recognizing a minimal degree of sub-
stitutability between them, find the requirement to be satisfied.  When
courts use the element to deny recovery too, their analysis is largely intui-
tive on both the competition and market fronts.
This extensive reliance on bare intuition to analyze this requirement
is somewhat perplexing, since the ideas of direct competition and pri-
mary market both bear a very strong resemblance to the market defini-
tion exercise routinely undertaken by federal courts in the antitrust con-
text.242  In determining whether a defendant has market power in a
relevant market, courts in antitrust cases first set out the relevant market.
Since the identification of market power remains their primary purpose,
the tests that they employ to define the market tend to be informed in
large measure by that purpose.  The inquiry commonly begins by measur-
ing the cross-elasticity of demand between the parties’ products available
on the market, and then adjusts for the possibilities of preexisting mo-
nopoly profits, price discrimination, and other situation-specific
factors.243
Trademark law too, at one point, required a clear showing of direct
competition between the parties and their products for a claim of in-
fringement to be sustained.244  In due course, however, it came to aban-
don this emphasis, as it began to expand the category of uses that would
constitute an act of infringement.245  At least part of the reason for this
241. See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 854 (discussing products and market
in concluding no unlawful misappropriation).
242. See United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–76 (1966) (defining
relevant market before determining whether illegal monopoly existed); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334–39 (1962) (defining relevant market before determining
whether potential merger would lessen competition); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394–404 (1956) (defining relevant market before
determining whether illegal monopoly existed).
243. See, e.g., Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition:  An
Integrated Approach, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1984) (discussing range of indicators of
market power and complexities involved in analyzing them).  For a more recent criticism
of the relevant market determination in antitrust law, see generally Louis Kaplow, Why
(Ever) Define Markets?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (2010) (explaining trademark law has “long
been regarded as a species of the broader law of unfair competition”).
244. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1888–89, 1899–904 (2007) (describing growth and decline of unfair
competition ideas in trademark law).
245. Id. at 1900; see also Prof’l Golfers Ass’n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514
F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Direct competition is not the sine qua non of trademark
infringement . . . .”); Ball v. Am. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 237 (Ct. App. 1971)
(“[D]irect competition between the parties is not a prerequisite to relief.”); 74 Am. Jur. 2d
Trademarks and Tradenames § 83 (2010) (“Direct competition between the parties is not
a prerequisite to a trademark infringement action, nor is it necessary that the products
involved be in direct competition.”).
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development, one might argue, derives from trademark law’s unique sta-
tus as a doctrine at the interface of unfair competition and property law.
The absence of a self-contained explanatory theory for trademark law
thus allowed it to expand in new directions, necessitating its abandon-
ment of the direct competition rule (or at least its erosion as a strict pre-
requisite to infringement).  Recent developments seem to suggest that a
similar fate awaits the direct competition requirement in hot news misap-
propriation as well.246  Rooting misappropriation in the principles of un-
just enrichment may, however, guard against this eventuality.
The direct competition requirement of hot news misappropriation is
not a mere formality; it is misappropriation’s very essence.  Its existence is
best accounted for by the theory of competitive unjust enrichment, which
views misappropriation as a solution to a collective action problem in an
information collection or dissemination market.  Since the doctrine was
aimed at encouraging the creation and preservation of collective or coop-
erative efforts, the viability of such cooperation depends entirely on the
parties in question having a common interest in a resource of value (i.e.,
news collection).  In other words, if the parties depend on the resource to
varying degrees in the production of their goods and services, or in struc-
turally different ways, such cooperation is extremely unlikely, thereby di-
luting misappropriation of its very basis.  An example is the difference in
competition between two daily newspapers (e.g., New York Times and
Washington Post) and between a daily newspaper and a weekly news maga-
zine (e.g., The Economist).  In the latter scenario, while they both rely on
news stories for their content, the nature and extent of their reliance
varies in great measure, rendering the possibility of their entering into a
collective effort to cooperate in the newsgathering exercise less likely.
Direct competition should thus be understood as a measure of par-
ties’ likelihood of cooperating to lower input costs.  Rather than eyebal-
ling the simple substitutability of parties’ final products, courts should
look to the competitive input that parties rely on in producing their prod-
uct or service.  Factors to consider would include:  (1) the nature and
extent to which the parties rely on the same input to compete; (2) the
manner in which they use the input to produce a product or service in
the market; (3) the prevalence and likelihood of cooperative arrange-
ments between competitors for the competitive effort in question; and
(4) if the plaintiff is a member of such an arrangement, the possibility of
the defendant’s entry into the collective.  Each of these factors goes to
measuring the homogeneity of parties’ interests in the valuable intangi-
ble that is the subject of controversy.
Using the idea of interest homogeneity to understand the direct
competition element will result in the doctrine being invoked with less
frequency against defendants that have little to gain from a cooperative
246. See infra notes 247–254 and accompanying text (describing how requirement R
was misapplied in recent case).
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arrangement with plaintiffs.  Rather than introducing an altogether new
norm of no free riding in such circumstances, the analysis would recog-
nize that there is in fact no market-based harm being corrected for, since
the defendant’s cost savings alone (from such free riding) has no effect
on the plaintiff’s profitability, the core concern in hot news misappropria-
tion.  The functioning of this approach is best illustrated by applying it to
the facts of a recent decision.
In Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, the plaintiffs were firms
engaged in the business of producing equity research recommendations,
which they disseminated to subscribers for a fee.247  The defendant was
an online subscription newsfeed that collected and published financial
news, rumors, and other market-related information exclusively on its
website.248  Among other news, the defendant website posted the finan-
cial recommendations of the plaintiff firms, principally in the form of
their factual content, while crediting the firms for them.249  The plaintiffs
alleged hot news misappropriation, and the trial court agreed with them.
In applying the direct competition requirement, the court undertook a
detailed comparison of the parties’ business models, products, and distri-
bution channels, and deemed irrelevant the fact that the defendant
merely reported news about the plaintiffs’ recommendations rather than
the recommendations themselves.250  This last point was crucial, for it
goes to the core of what the direct competition requirement in the com-
petitive unjust enrichment model is trying to achieve.
Focusing on an analysis of parties’ homogeneity of interests as part of
the direct competition analysis would have resulted in a very different
outcome.  First, the parties in the case clearly rely on different inputs as
part of their competitive process.  The plaintiffs produce their own rec-
ommendations, which is not the same as the defendant’s communication
of those conclusions as factual news.  In other words, the plaintiffs actively
make the news that the defendants report.  The analogy is thus to a news-
paper summarizing a presidential speech.  The President makes the news,
while the newspaper merely disseminates it.  Second, since their inputs
are very different, it is likely that their outputs are too.  Whereas the
plaintiff firms derive their market from the contents of what they produce
as recommendations, the defendant does so from being a conduit carry-
ing the factual elements of what multiple firms (such as the plaintiffs) say.
Timeliness is crucial to both the plaintiffs and the defendant, but this
does not necessarily cut in favor of their being essentially the same prod-
uct.  The defendant does not merely pass the plaintiffs’ recommenda-
tions off as its own, but consciously credits them as those of the plaintiffs,
which is their principal source of value, as far as the defendant is con-
247. 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
248. Id. at 322–27.
249. Id. at 323.
250. Id. at 339–41.
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cerned.251  The parties’ products are thus hardly identical, and very dif-
ferent from that seen among newspapers competing in the same market.
Third, the plaintiff firms and the defendant are very unlikely to enter into
a cooperative arrangement to defray the costs of their activities, since
their expenditures derive from very different activities.  For the plaintiffs,
expenditures derive primarily from hiring skilled, knowledgeable analysts
to generate recommendations, while for the defendant, expenditures de-
rive mainly from hiring skilled reporters to summarize and organize these
recommendations with accuracy and efficiency.252  Had the court at-
tempted to analyze direct competition through the lens of the hot news
doctrine’s structural purposes and the theory of competitive enrichment
that it is premised on, it would have been forced to conclude that this
core element was completely missing.
An interest-homogeneity approach would also caution against the
ready extension of the doctrine to new uses of information, a move that
would effectively convert hot news into a property interest in the news.
The attempted extension of the doctrine to cover bloggers is a good ex-
ample here.253  Merely because an individual uses information collected
by another, even if for commercial purposes, hardly renders him a direct
competitor in the collective action sense in which the requirement
emerged.  In other words, a blogger is unlikely to be incentivized (by the
misappropriation doctrine) to enter the enterprise of news collection—
the doctrine’s core objective.  An action against a blogger is unlikely to
result in the blogger independently collecting the news, or indeed in
joining a cooperative effort for this purpose.  To equate direct competi-
tion with the mere use of the same product, or indeed its effects on a
collector’s sales would dilute the requirement of its core significance.  A
competitor thus needs to be seeking profits “at the same time and in the
same field,” constraints that should be recognized in applying this
requirement.254
2. The Duty to Police and Incentive Effects. — A second doctrinal anom-
aly of the hot news doctrine that property- and intellectual property-based
theories have been hard pressed to account for is the requirement—
251. The court’s own observation highlights this point:
In contrast, there is no evidence that a Recommendation by [the defendant] itself
to buy, sell, or hold a particular stock would be given any weight whatsoever by
any investor.  Thus, it is essential to [the defendant’s] misappropriation of the
[plaintiffs’] research capital that it connect each Recommendation to its source.
Id. at 337.
252. Id. at 336–37.
253. See Nate Anderson, Is Permission Needed to Retweet Hot News?, ARS Technica,
at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/04/is-permission-needed-to-retween-
hot-news.ars (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) (discussing
application of hot news doctrine to aggregators and “those that simply rewrite the facts
contained in the story and publish a new account in their own words”).
254. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
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made explicit by a recent court opinion255—that a defendant might be
able to avoid liability by showing that the plaintiff has failed to make rea-
sonable efforts to rein in the systematic free riding activities of other com-
petitors (i.e., beyond the plaintiff and the defendant) in the market.
While some claim that the requirement is a recent development in the
law of hot news, traces of it are evident in at least one prior decision.256
At first blush, especially from a property point of view, the require-
ment may seem anomalous.  No other intellectual property regime allows
a defendant to avoid or reduce his liability by showing that another com-
petitor, i.e., a third party, committed a similar action.257  A copyright de-
fendant can thus hardly claim as a defense that others continue to copy a
plaintiff’s protected work on a regular basis.  The same is equally true, of
course, in property law, where a plaintiff is given the absolute discretion
to pick and choose from among multiple trespassers in commencing an
action.  Evidentiary and other strategic considerations are thought to
favor vesting a plaintiff with this discretion.
The oddity, though, originates entirely from viewing copying (free
riding) in the hot news context as a freestanding wrong.  It is in this cru-
cial respect, however, that hot news as a nonproprietary doctrine differs
most significantly from other property and intellectual property interests,
where the mere boundary crossing (i.e., trespass, use, or copying) by a
defendant is made actionable.258  Since the normative significance of free
riding in misappropriation differs quite significantly from traditional in-
255. See Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d at 347–48 (holding injunction will be
lifted if plaintiff does not “take[ ] reasonable steps to restrain the systematic, unauthorized
misappropriation of their [services]” by market participants other than defendant).
256. See Andrew L. Deutsch et al., Publishers Increasingly Invoke “Hot News”
Doctrine, Nat’l L.J., May 17, 2010, at 27 (describing requirement as “novel”).  For a
previous use of this requirement, see, e.g., Silver v. Lavandeira, No. 08 Civ. 6522(JSR)(DF),
2009 WL 513031, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2009) (noting how widespread availability of
information sought to be protected contradicted a claim for its exclusivity under hot
news).
257. See, e.g., Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 766
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (“[A]n owner is not required to act immediately against every possibly
infringing use to avoid a holding of abandonment.”).  Trademark law comes closest to
recognizing something similar, by imposing on trademark holders an affirmative duty to
control the use of their mark.  It thus disallows what is known as “naked licensing”—i.e.,
allowing a licensee to use the mark without any quality control over such use.  See J.
Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 18:48 (4th ed.
2010).  Such naked licensing results in a trademark owner losing the exclusive right to use
the mark, with it being treated as an abandonment of sorts.  Id.  The logic underlying this
duty of control derives largely from the communicative function of the trademark, very
different from the duty imposed in relation to time-sensitive information in hot news
misappropriation.  See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d
Cir. 1959) (“Clearly the only effective way to protect the public where a trademark is used
by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirmative duty of policing in a reasonable
manner the activities of his licensees.”).
258. See generally Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:  Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1795 (2007) [hereinafter Smith,
Intellectual Property] (discussing “exclusion rights” given by patents).
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tellectual property, it is tested individually in each case.259  In other
words, copyright and patent laws are presumed to be about providing
authors and inventors with efficient incentives to create or invent.  Yet
this incentive is thought to operate at the systemic level and is never
tested in individual cases to see if it actually holds true, i.e., if the copy-
right or patent systems actually induced the creative or inventive activity
in question.260  In misappropriation, on the other hand, the effects of the
free riding in question are scrutinized in each individual case, to see if
the free riding is likely to impair the incentive to continue producing the
same good or service in the market, not just for the plaintiff, but for
others as well.  Rather than allowing these effects to be presumed from
the mere fact of copying or free riding, misappropriation demands that
courts undertake this scrutiny upon being presented with actual
evidence.261
In the competitive enrichment understanding of hot news, the in-
centives that matter the most are the ones likely to further entrench a
collective action problem.  In other words, it is only when free riding in
the market is so prevalent that new entrants are unlikely to either cooper-
ate or collect on their own—putting the entire enterprise of news collec-
tion at risk—that the law cares to intervene.262  Understood from this
perspective, the duty to police imposed on plaintiffs begins to make
sense.  A finding that the practice of systematic free riding in the market
has continued unabated for a significant period of time would thus reveal
that the defendant’s free riding being complained of is unlikely to ad-
versely impact collection efforts currently in place in that very market.
This could, of course, come about because of a variety of factors, includ-
ing the possibility that the structure of norms underlying the collection
efforts has changed over time.  The duty to police thus operates princi-
pally as evidence that the defendant’s free riding is indeed likely to im-
pact the plaintiff’s and other information collectors’ incentives.263
259. See Posner, supra note 28, at 638–39 (describing and critiquing this R
requirement).
260. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv.
L. Rev. 1569, 1588–89 (2009) (making this point in relation to copyright law); Stewart E.
Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 1207–08, 1213–14
(1996) (discussing relationship between copyrights and incentives and noting “few efforts
[have been made] to limit copyright protection to those areas in which incentives are likely
to have an effect on the level of creative activity”).
261. But see Posner, supra note 28, at 632 (observing how this requirement is proxy R
for first four elements of hot news doctrine).
262. On this point, it is telling that in National Basketball Ass’n the court chose to
couch this requirement in terms that extended beyond both the plaintiff and the
defendant.  See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so
reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality would
be substantially threatened.”).
263. One might argue that the duty to police imposes an undue burden on
information gatherers to actually commence a legal action against every possible free rider
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The policing requirement, above all else, points to misappropria-
tion’s nonproprietary origins.  In the traditional property-based intellec-
tual property context, the reason such a requirement would have no basis
is because a plaintiff’s interest is thought to come into existence com-
pletely independent of the defendant’s actions—i.e., upon creation or
invention (subject, of course, to administrative requirements).  Licensing
away uses of the intangible, thereby creating an ex ante market, is thus
considered an integral part of the regime’s utility in the first place.  In
this context, rampant, uncompensated copying could hardly be said to
cut against recognizing an entitlement in the plaintiff.  In misappropria-
tion, by contrast, there exists no ex ante legal entitlement until the defen-
dant is competitively enriched at the plaintiff’s expense.  Being entirely
relational then, a preexisting market for licenses is hardly among the re-
gime’s objectives.264
Additionally, a showing of rampant, systematic free riding by others
in the market would also seriously undermine the idea that the defen-
dant’s actions are unfair in the competitive sense.  Recall that the basis of
the entitlement in misappropriation is that the defendant is able to save
large costs (and thereby enhance its profitability) vis-à-vis others in the
merely to preserve their future claims, and that this is likely to ignore the various economic
and strategic reasons why they might have consciously chosen not to sue.  To alleviate this
concern, the duty ought to be considered discharged, and the claim sufficiently preserved,
whenever a plaintiff can establish some minimal amount of diligence on its part to detect
and deter harmful free riding.  Cease and desist letters, or other forms of self-help should
be deemed sufficient in this regard.
264. One might argue that this requirement tracks the well-known trespass/nuisance
distinction in tort and real property law.  While the law of trespass is thought to protect
property’s “right to exclude,” the core ownership interest inherent in the exclusivity of
possession, the law of nuisance is said to concern itself with an individual’s right to use and
enjoy the property, independent of any exclusivity as such.  See Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, Property:  Principles and Policies 22–23 (2007) (describing nuisances as
“interferences with the use and enjoyment of land caused by some activity on neighboring
land”).  In evaluating the very existence of a plaintiff’s entitlement in nuisance, the law
often imposes a requirement of unreasonableness that is only ever determined relationally,
by undertaking a relative cost-benefit analysis of the parties’ actions.  Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 826 (1979) (applying utility test to determine nuisance).  Nuisance law
thus hardly attempts to create a tradable entitlement up front, independent of the
resource itself, whereas trespass law, one might argue, especially when viewed through the
market for leases and licenses to enter real property, is consciously directed at facilitating
just such a market.  For scholarly work examining this divide in more detail, see Thomas
W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal
Stud. 13, 20–26 (1985) (discussing how disparity between trespass as “mechanical
entitlement-determination rule” and nuisance as “judgmental entitlement-determination
rule” leads these doctrines to be applied to situations of differing transaction cost levels);
Smith, Law of Nuisance, supra note 52, at 975–90 (noting “property rules . . . forc[e] R
anyone who wants to engage in a use to bargain with the present owner,” while liability
rules, associated with nuisance, “are used to fine-tune basic exclusionary regimes in high-
stakes contexts”).  The comparison to nuisance nonetheless breaks down somewhat
because of the law of servitudes and easements, which allows landowners to buy and sell
their use and enjoyment privileges, the very subject matter of nuisance claims.
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market.  In a situation where others in the market are engaged in the
same practice as the defendant, its unfair competitive advantage is dimin-
ished significantly.  Indeed, in such a scenario, to grant a plaintiff relief
would be to place the defendant under an obvious competitive
disadvantage.
B. Remedial Options
Grounding hot news misappropriation in a theory of competitive un-
just enrichment is also likely to have major implications for the remedial
response that a court may adopt once the substantive requirements of the
doctrine are satisfied.  First, it calls into question courts’ thus far under-
scrutinized practice of awarding injunctive relief in hot news misappro-
priation cases as a matter of course.  Second, it sheds light on what an alter-
native, restitutionary award of damages might look like.
1. The Questionable Default of Injunctive Relief. — In almost every suc-
cessful hot news misappropriation case since International News, courts
have awarded a remedy in the nature of an injunction.265  The injunction
usually prohibits the defendant from free riding on the plaintiff’s infor-
mation for a specified period of time after its publication.  What is strik-
ing about this reality is that it is usually accompanied by very little discus-
sion of why injunctive relief ought to be the obvious remedial choice for
courts.
In International News, the majority made the move from substance to
remedy without much reasoning at all.  The logic behind the misappro-
priation doctrine (then and now) hardly comports with the exclusive use
of injunctions as a remedial response.  The basis of misappropriation lies
in a defendant’s obtaining an unfair competitive advantage by relying on
the plaintiff’s cost and time intensive information-gathering efforts.  Its
unfairness thus arises from the unjust enrichment provided to the defen-
dant through cost savings.  What is crucial to understand is that until this
enrichment (i.e., cost savings) occurs, the plaintiff itself is vested with no
primary right and correlatively, the defendant is under no primary
duty.266  Indeed, what makes unjust enrichment an independent basis of
265. To be sure, such claims are often accompanied by ones for copyright
infringement or other unfair competition causes.  Yet, in cases where hot news
misappropriation is the successful cause of action, the tendency is overwhelmingly in favor
of granting injunctive relief.  See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
245–46 (1918) (upholding district court’s injunction); Standard & Poor’s Corp. v.
Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 712 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding preliminary
injunction in case of alleged misappropriation of stock index in sale of futures contracts);
Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 343–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(issuing injunction for misappropriation); Bd. of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84,
90–91 (Ill. 1983) (prohibiting Chicago Board of Trade from using “Dow Jones Industrial
Average as a basis of stock index futures contracts”).
266. Here and elsewhere, the idea that the misappropriation doctrine (and indeed
unjust enrichment more generally) does not create an ex ante entitlement should not be
taken to imply that it lacks a framework for recovery from which entitlements can be
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recovery in the common law is its creation of a primary obligation (of
restitution) based on the defendant’s actions.267  A primary right is one
whose existence is not dependent on the breach of a preexisting right or
duty, unlike a secondary right that comes into existence only upon such a
breach.268  The tort of negligence, for instance, operates to create a sec-
ondary right (to compensation) for the breach of a primary duty (of
care), imposed on individuals, that the defendant breached.  In a similar
vein, the tort of trespass creates a secondary right for the breach of a
primary duty (of inviolability) that correlates with a property owner’s
right to exclude.  In situations of unjust enrichment, however, the law
does not just create a secondary right to vindicate a primary right along
the lines of tort and property law, but rather recognizes a defendant’s
actions to create an altogether new primary duty appropriate to the cir-
cumstances.  Unjust enrichment involves the legal creation of a primary
obligation to restore the benefit obtained in a certain context; and this distin-
guishes it from other areas of the common law.269
The right created by unjust enrichment, unlike other primary rights,
is also highly specified in content, thereby obviating the need for an inde-
pendent secondary right.270  Unjust enrichment thus vests a plaintiff with
a right to restoration as an enforceable primary right.  Now consider the
choice of remedy to enforce this right.  Injunctive relief is by its very na-
ture forward looking and directed at preventing the occurrence of an
action that is likely to bring about a breach of duty or the interference
with a party’s right.  This is in contrast to damages, which are principally
backward looking.  On the face of things, forward looking injunctive re-
lief might seem to make sense in cases of unjust enrichment.  Why not
prevent the problematic transfer (i.e., the enrichment and corresponding
loss) rather than wait for it to happen and then correct it through restora-
discerned ex ante.  Being able to discern an entitlement ex ante and plan for or around its
existence and enforcement is vastly different from the law’s ex ante recognition of a legally
enforceable entitlement.  The legal basis of the entitlement, for unjust enrichment, comes
into existence only after the event of enrichment has actually occurred.  I thus agree with
the idea, offered by some scholars, that unjust enrichment law is capable of signaling
entitlements ex ante.  See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Restitution’s Realism, in Philosophical
Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment, supra note 157, at 54, 68–69 (arguing “it is R
important to set up the ex ante entitlements for [mistaken payment cases] in a way that
properly addresses the autonomy and the welfare concerns of both [parties]”).  I would
emphasize, however, that the law does not enforce them in their ex ante status without
connecting it to some other interest.
267. See Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 160, at 3 (noting that law of unjust R
enrichment is based on “restitution [which] is a right to a gain received by the
defendant”).
268. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays 101–02 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919)
(discussing difference between in rem primary rights and in personam secondary rights).
269. See Grantham & Rickett, supra note 215, at 163 (describing right to restoration R
as primary right).
270. Id. (noting unjust enrichment “requires no secondary right to found the grant of
restoration”).
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tion?  The answer derives entirely from the fact that prior to the transfer
(i.e., the enrichment), the plaintiff has no primary interest at all that the
law can come to support and enforce.  This is where the divergence of
unjust enrichment from other parts of the common law assumes func-
tional significance.  Tort, property, and contract law each create secon-
dary rights and duties that operate above a set of primary ones, and in-
junctive relief (or its equivalent, e.g., specific performance) can be
understood as enforcing these primary obligations; unjust enrichment,
on the other hand, has no similar equivalent.  Consequently, unless in-
junctive relief purports to have no connection to the underlying substan-
tive right, it remains unviable as an immediate option.
One might, however, argue that unjust enrichment in reality creates
a secondary right—for the remedial enforcement of the primary obliga-
tion of restoration that the defendant has failed to discharge.271  In other
words, unjust enrichment does not just create a primary right, but instead
imposes liability for the nonperformance of an obligation that the cir-
cumstances created.272  Even if this view were accepted, it hardly cuts in
favor of injunctive relief as a remedy.  The effect of this secondary right
approach to unjust enrichment is to blur the distinction between unjust
enrichment and the law of torts, since it renders the nonfulfillment of the
primary obligation (of restoration) an actionable wrong.  All the same, it
does little to change the internal content of the obligation itself, which
remains restorative.  Restoration, however, remains an affirmative duty,
which sets it apart from other tort law duties that are largely negative in
structure.  As a preventive remedy, injunctive relief then has little connec-
tion to restoration except when tied to a preexisting interest around
which to operationalize the affirmative duty (e.g., a property right).  In
the absence of a pre-primary interest of this kind in unjust enrichment,
injunctive relief can do little by way of furthering the restorative content
of the obligation in unjust enrichment, be it primary or secondary in
structure.
Consider this logic in the context of hot news misappropriation.  Let
us start from the basic proposition that factual news is a public domain
271. For an extensive discussion of this line of reasoning, see Kit Barker, Rescuing
Remedialism in Unjust Enrichment Law:  Why Remedies Are Right, 57 Cambridge L.J. 301,
319–27 (1998) (discussing rights and remedies in context of unjust enrichment law and
advocating development of “more fully integrated remedial scheme”); Peter Birks, Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 6–25 (2000) (advocating for language
of rights, rather than remedies, for law’s response to wrongs); Stephen A. Smith, The
Structure of Unjust Enrichment Law:  Is Restitution a Right or a Remedy?, 36 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1037, 1040 (2003) [hereinafter Smith, Structure of Unjust Enrichment] (concluding
“restitutionary orders can rightly be regarded as either remedial orders or as direct
enforcement orders”).
272. See Smith, Structure of Unjust Enrichment, supra note 271, at 1040–41 R
(discussing this distinction in terms of “direct enforcement” orders and “remedial”
orders).  Very interestingly, Smith expressly excludes injunctions from the scope of this
analysis, perhaps in recognition of their inherent incompatibility with unjust enrichment.
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resource—unowned, in the commons, and freely accessible by all.  This
implies that even upon its cost and time intensive collection, no one, not
even its collector, has an exclusionary legal entitlement over it in the ab-
stract.  It is, to use Justice Brandeis’s language, “free as the air to common
use.”273  Now when a competitor enters the picture and gains lawful ac-
cess to this public domain resource but uses it to obtain a competitive
cost advantage, the law of misappropriation seeks to nullify that advan-
tage, which it deems an act of unfair competition.  Its method of doing so
entails restoring to the plaintiff the cost advantage obtained by the defen-
dant, thereby purporting to put them on a level playing field.  The defen-
dant’s competitive actions thus create a duty of restoration (and a correla-
tive right), which like traditional unjust enrichment law originates in the
circumstances and context involved.  Misappropriation can be under-
stood to generate this obligation (a primary right), or to enforce the right
that the circumstances created (a secondary right).  Regardless of struc-
ture, though, the obligation is one of nullifying the unfair competitive
advantage.  Since injunctive relief is by its very nature forward looking, it
would have to be granted before the defendant’s actions have occurred,
and thus prior to an obligation of any kind being imposed on the defen-
dant.  Yet prior to the emergence of this obligation, the plaintiff has no
individual entitlement that the injunction can vindicate, given the collec-
tive, public domain nature of the information.  Thus, to speak of a duty
not to misappropriate hot news (analogous to a duty not to be unjustly
enriched) makes little sense, since its correlative right is never vested in
an individual competitor, but is in the nature of a group or collective
right that is incapable of being individually enforced.274
Some of this logic also resonates with tort law’s general reluctance to
award injunctive relief except when an identifiable property right, operat-
ing as a preexisting interest, is involved.275  Rarely do courts award in-
junctions in tort claims that involve an interest identified in the abstract
273. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
274. Additionally, injunctions framed in such terms raise serious constitutional issues
owing to their lack of specificity, overbreadth, and the distinct possibility of contempt
proceedings for noncompliance.  Often referred to as “obey the law” injunctions, courts
have increasingly exhibited a general reluctance to allow their issuance, despite their
having been the norm for decades in some areas of the law.  See SEC v. Wash. Inv.
Network, 475 F.3d 392, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding injunction enjoining future violations
of Investment Advisers Act insufficiently specific to uphold); SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225,
1233 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005) (refusing to enforce “‘obey-the-law’ injunction” because an
“injunction must be framed so that those enjoined know exactly what conduct the court
has prohibited” (quoting Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1223 (11th Cir. 2000))); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 665
F.2d 1310, 1318–19 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to enforce part of injunction that forbade
engaging “in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit”).
275. See John Murphy, Rethinking Injunctions in Tort Law, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud.
509, 509–11 (2007) (arguing for expansion of availability of injunctions in tort law).
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(e.g., a right not to be negligently injured).  They remain willing to do so
only when the interest is a property or property-like interest.  The pur-
ported reason behind this is the fact that most tort claims, with the excep-
tion of property-related ones, are contingent on specific consequences
accruing from a defendant’s actions.276  Thus, negligence is actionable
only upon a showing of harm that was a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the defendant’s actions.  To intervene before these conse-
quences develop would convert the action into a vastly different one.
Analytical reasons apart, the costs of uncertainty also favor avoiding
injunctive relief in hot news cases, at least as the default remedy.277  In-
junctive relief for entitlements in information may generate costs beyond
those traditionally seen in tangible property.  Often, such relief is incapa-
ble of being tailored with precision in advance, so as to avoid including
perfectly legitimate activities within its scope.278  As a result, plaintiffs try
to leverage their entitlements for amounts well in excess of what the enti-
tlements are valued at ex post, producing inefficient results in the mar-
ket.279  Mark Lemley and Phil Weiser refer to this real or threatened use
of litigation as the holdup strategy in intellectual property.280  In hot
news misappropriation cases, the uncertainty surrounding a plaintiff’s en-
titlement is unavoidable.  A defendant’s act of lifting the factual content
from a competitor’s news story is rendered actionable by misappropria-
tion, while the act of accessing and reading that content and using it as a
tip to obtain the exact same information is deemed perfectly acceptable,
and indeed necessary in the industry.281  Yet the line between lifting facts
from a competitor’s story and using it as a tip for a newspaper’s own story
is perilously narrow and incapable of being policed within the remedial
framework.  In this scenario, relying on injunctive relief as a default rem-
edy runs the risk of impairing the beneficial (and efficient) practice of
using factual tips, resulting in a grossly inefficient duplication of efforts,
276. For a critique of this logic, albeit in simplistic terms, see id. at 524–30.
277. For an identification of this problem and its elaboration, see Stewart E. Sterk,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 Mich. L. Rev.
1285, 1329 (2008) (“When removal costs are high, property-rule protection—awarding
injunctive relief to the copy-right holder—is likely to encourage inefficient search and
punish users who act efficiently.”).
278. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information?, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 783, 793–95 (2007) (arguing rights that cannot be
clearly defined, such as patent and copyright, mean that “injunctive relief is a remedy with
significant error costs”).
279. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L.
Rev. 1991, 1994–2010 (2007) (studying this phenomenon in relation to patents); Lemley &
Weiser, supra note 278, at 795 (“[B]ecause rights holders know that they can obtain an R
injunction that disadvantages the defendant more than it benefits them, they use that
knowledge to drive settlement rates well above the ‘benchmark’ rate . . . .”).
280. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 278, at 795. R
281. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 243–44 (1918) (“[B]oth
parties avowedly recognize the practice of taking tips, and neither party alleges it to be
unlawful or to amount to unfair competition in business.”).
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or alternatively, in the creation of an effective monopoly for information
gatherers with a competitive advantage.  Indeed, if the ability to obtain
injunctive relief of this form had been the norm when news collection
and dissemination first emerged, it is doubtful whether cooperative new-
sgathering among competitors of different sizes would be as prevalent as
it is today.
There is also a perhaps more straightforward explanation for making
damages the default remedy in hot news misappropriation cases.  In eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court concluded that in choos-
ing between remedial options to protect a substantive right, courts had to
follow equity’s traditional four-factor test to rule out the suitability of
monetary damages before granting injunctive relief.282  This process is
mandated regardless of substantive area, and even when the substantive
right involved is the right to exclude, i.e., a property right.283  Courts in
hot news misappropriation cases are thus now mandated to begin with
the default of monetary relief once a substantive claim is made out, and
then only upon a showing of its unsuitability can they move toward grant-
ing injunctive relief.  Should courts come to recognize the central pur-
pose of the doctrine as being about remedying an unfair cost saving by a
defendant, damages will likely be deemed sufficient in an overwhelming
majority of cases.
Very rarely, courts seem willing to award plaintiffs injunctive relief in
unjust enrichment cases even prior to the occurrence of an actual enrich-
ment.284  These are usually situations where the defendant’s enrichment
is imminent, with the injunctions aptly referred to as “quia timet injunc-
tions.”285  Quia timet injunctions are not, strictly speaking, restitutionary
remedies, since no enrichment has yet occurred that would require resti-
tution.  All the same, these injunctions derive from the exact same logic
that underlies ordinary restitutionary relief,286 except that they are cou-
pled with an attempt to avoid multiple lawsuits and the transaction costs
likely to accompany the enrichment and its annulment.  Relief of this
282. 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).  See generally John M. Golden, Principles for Patent
Remedies, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 505, 577–79 (2010) (observing how four-factor rule originated
in relation to preliminary injunctions, and made its way into analysis of permanent
injunctions through use of presumptions).
283. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 392 (“[T]he creation of a right is distinct from the provision
of remedies for violations of that right.”).
284. See Charles Mitchell, The Law of Contribution and Reimbursement 49–50
(2003) (“In some circumstances English law gives a claimant a remedy the purpose of
which is not to reverse a defendant’s unjust enrichment . . . but to prevent the . . . unjust
enrichment . . . from arising in the first place.”); Charlie Webb, What Is Unjust
Enrichment?, 29 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 215, 234–35 (2009) (discussing instances in which a
claimant demands that the “defendant . . . pay his fair share to the creditor at the outset”).
285. Mitchell, supra note 284, at 50; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 855 (9th ed. R
2009) (defining quia timet injunction as “[a]n injunction granted to prevent an action that
has been threatened but has not yet violated the plaintiff’s rights”).
286. Webb, supra note 284, at 234 (noting how “the law is doing the same thing here R
and for the same reasons”).
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nature is only ever granted in a narrow set of unjust enrichment cases
usually involving multiple parties.287
In a similar vein, courts adjudicating hot news misappropriation
cases should view their discretion to grant injunctive relief as limited to
the extremely narrow set of cases where a defendant’s enrichment is im-
minent, and the injunction does no more than minimize the administra-
tive costs of allowing the enrichment to occur and then undoing it.  Most
importantly, in such cases, the availability of injunctive relief should not
be seen as altering the normative basis or structure of the claim, which
will remain restitutionary.
2. Calculating Restitutionary Damages. — Rejecting injunctive relief as
the default remedy in hot news cases brings us to the question of comput-
ing appropriate damages.  As noted earlier, remedies for misappropria-
tion were directed at annulling gains derived by a defendant from system-
atic reliance on the plaintiff’s efforts, whereby a defendant obtains an
unfair advantage by lowering its own collection costs.288  This formula-
tion is crucial, since the gain is not simply the defendant’s profitability,
which may have come about owing to other factors, but rather its en-
hanced profitability due to its unfair cost savings.  The ideal solution is
therefore one that focuses on annulling this cost savings and its effects on
the defendant.
There are two possible ways by which this solution can be achieved.
In the first, called the standard of comparison approach, a defendant’s
actual cost savings is thought to be large enough so as to form the sole
basis of damages and is directly measured.  In situations where the defen-
dant has not made a large enough profit, or where the profit is small
relative to the monetary value of the advantage the defendant obtained
from its acts of free riding, a plaintiff might choose to adopt this ap-
proach for computing restitutionary damages.  This measure is likely to
be used against defendants whose business models are built entirely
around free riding.
A second alternative, the attributable profits approach, attempts to
calculate a defendant’s cost savings through its profits earned, and attrib-
utable to, its free riding.  Here, the defendant is forced to disgorge all
earnings that are causally attributable to its free riding, which are taken to
represent its unfair advantage.  This approach is most meaningful against
a defendant who is a profitable competitor in the market, who decided to
free ride to cut its own collection costs.  By determining what proportion
of its profits derives from its own efforts rather than its free riding, and
disgorging the latter, any cost savings and related benefits can be
annulled.
287. See, e.g., Stimpson v. Smith, [1999] Ch. 340, 350 (Eng.) (finding right of
contribution between co-sureties where “there is no problem in ascertaining the amount of
the contribution”).
288. See supra Part II.A.2.d (discussing remedy where plaintiff’s recovery is linked to
defendant’s disgorgement of unfair cost savings derived from its free riding).
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a. The Standard of Comparison Approach. — The standard of compari-
son measure is commonly used in trade secrets cases where a defendant’s
benefit consists primarily in the cost savings that it realizes from its ac-
tions.289  This approach determines a defendant’s gain by comparing the
defendant’s actual costs with the costs it would have incurred if it had not
undertaken the misappropriation.290  Originating in patent law, this mea-
sure attempts to determine the “fruits of the advantage which [the defen-
dant] derived from the use of that invention, over what he would have
had in using other means then open to the public and adequate to en-
able him to obtain an equally beneficial result.”291  The cost savings mea-
sured is in turn viewed as the equivalent of any profits that the defendant
might have earned from its actions.292
Translating this approach into the hot news context would entail de-
termining the newsgathering costs that a free riding defendant saves
through its actions.  Since the focus in hot news misappropriation cases is
on systematic (as opposed to one-off) free riding over a period of time,
this is unlikely to be hard to determine.  Variables are likely to include a
plaintiff’s costs of hiring and maintaining correspondents for a specific
geographic area, the costs of sending them to independently investigate a
story, and the costs involved in transmitting this information back to the
editorial office on a timely basis.293  These costs are likely to vary directly
with the extent of a defendant’s free riding—i.e., whether it free rides on
the efforts of just one newspaper or a group of them.
This measure of damages is likely to work best in situations where the
defendant’s business model is built entirely around free riding, or where
its profits from its actions as such are not large enough to operate as a
deterrent when disgorged to the plaintiff.
289. See Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 908 F.2d 706, 714–15 (11th Cir.
1990) (approving of lower court’s use of only costs saved by defendant in calculating
damages); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 930–32 (10th Cir. 1975) (approving use
of standard of comparison measure because “[n]ot to have allowed such would have been
a denial to IBM of a substantial portion of the damage sustained by it”); Int’l Indus. v.
Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (3d Cir. 1957) (describing standard of
comparison measure as “the comparison of the cost . . . by means of the use of the trade
secret with a method of accomplishing the same result which would have been open to
defendant had he not appropriated the trade secret”); Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition § 45 cmt. f (1995) (“The traditional form of restitutionary relief in an action
for the appropriation of a trade secret is an accounting of the defendant’s profits on sales
attributable to the use of the trade secret.”); 1 Palmer, supra note 171, § 2.8, at 111–12 R
(describing goal of standard of comparison measure as “depriv[ing] the defendant of the
expense saved by the wrongful use of the trade secret”).
290. 1 Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law § 7:23, at 7-127 to 7-128 (2003).
291. Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 146 (1888).
292. See International Indus., 248 F.2d at 702 (noting how in this process “the profits
are simply measured by the savings determined” (emphasis omitted)).
293. In the district court case that preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in
International News, the plaintiff claimed that this exercise cost $3,500,000.  Associated Press
v. Int’l News Serv., 240 F. 983, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
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b. The Attributable Profits Approach. — Another common measure of
restitutionary damages involves ascertaining the defendant’s net profits
and then determining what portion of it is attributable to its acts of free
riding.294  This represents the effects of its cost savings on its profitability,
which can then be disgorged to the plaintiff.  Copyright and trade secrets
law routinely allow the use of this measure, as does trademark law.295  It
enables a plaintiff to recover the defendant’s profits after deducting for
the defendant’s own expenses and other factors that might have been
causally responsible for the profits.296
This approach, however, focuses on a defendant’s actual rather than
hypothetical profits.297  Consequently, it only makes sense in situations
where the defendant has made a profit that is in large measure causally
linked to its free riding.  In apportioning the profits on this causal basis,
courts eliminate parts that reveal little connection between the free rid-
ing and the defendant’s earnings, and where it is unclear if the defendant
earned anything at all specifically from the free riding.298
294. 1 Palmer, supra note 171, § 2.12, at 161–62. R
295. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover . . .
any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into
account in computing the actual damages.”); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
§ 45 cmt. c (1995) (describing compensatory damages and restitution available for
appropriation of trade secrets); id. § 37 cmts. g–h (discussing calculation of damages for
trademark infringement); see also Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 1972)
(holding that plaintiff had right to recover all profits of defendant from trade secret
appropriation, regardless of whether it caused loss for plaintiff); Schreyer v. Casco Prods.
Corp., 190 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1951) (upholding trial court’s award of damages based
on accounting of profits defendant made from unfair competition practices).
296. See 4 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 91, § 14.03 (discussing this process in R
copyright law).
297. Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 (5th Cir.
1974) (“[T]he defendant is normally not assessed damages on wholly speculative
expectations of profits.”); Associated Residential Design, LLC v. Molotky, 226 F. Supp. 2d
1251, 1255 (D. Nev. 2002) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has limited the recovery of indirect
profits to those that are non-speculative and directly attributable to the infringement.”
(citing Mackie v. Reiser, 296 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2002))); 4 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra
note 91, § 14.03[A] (quoting Judge Posner for proposition that damages in copyright cases R
cannot be based on “imagine[d] fantastic success”).
298. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 520 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“Once the copyright owner has established the amount of the infringer’s gross revenues,
the burden shifts to the infringer to prove either that part or all of those revenues are
‘deductible expenses’ (i.e., are not profits), or that they are ‘attributable to factors other
than the copyrighted work.’”); Mackie, 296 F.3d at 915 (“[A] district court must conduct a
threshold inquiry into whether there is a legally sufficient causal link between the
[copyright] infringement and subsequent indirect profits.”); USM Corp. v. Marson
Fastener Corp., 467 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (Mass. 1984) (“Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a
defendant made a profit from the sale of products produced by improper use of a trade
secret, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate those costs [were] offset
against . . . the portion of its profit attributable to factors other than the trade secret.”
(citing Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 1358 n.14 (Mass. 1979))); 4
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 91, § 14.03[B][2] (“The copyright owner is entitled to R
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In the hot news misappropriation context, this would commence
with a court ascertaining if the defendant made any profit at all, and if so,
how much it amounts to in gross.  It would then allow the defendant to
deduct any expenses of its own that it incurred, such as overhead, admin-
istrative, and other recurring expenses.  This is likely to be significant if
the defendant is an entity that collects information on its own, or through
other (nonmisappropriation-based) strategies.  Salient among these costs
might also be the expenses incurred by a defendant in independently
investigating any tips it legitimately obtained from competitors.  A court
would then move to determining how much of the defendant’s profits
can be causally linked to the information the defendant obtained
through free riding.
Disgorging the defendant’s gain, represented in its cost savings,
would thus firmly root hot news misappropriation in the idea of competi-
tive unjust enrichment.  It would ensure that the remedial corrective
courts offer comports with the reasons for the action and is neither
under- nor overinclusive in coverage.  Depending on the circumstances
of the case and the peculiarities of the defendant’s enterprise and free
riding, one approach to disgorging a defendant’s gain might be prefera-
ble to another, and either plaintiffs or courts should have the option of
deciding between them.  Most importantly, it would at the very least en-
sure that in hot news misappropriation cases, courts begin to engage with
the question of appropriate damages—something that they have failed to
do since International News.
C. Clues to the First Amendment Puzzle
Perhaps more intriguing than courts’ refusal to develop a method of
calculating damages in hot news misappropriation cases is the fact that, to
date, no court has examined the extent to which the action remains com-
patible with the constitutional guarantees of free speech under the First
Amendment.  In International News, Justice Brandeis’s dissent alluded to
the doctrine’s potential speech-limiting effects.299  Given the lack of a ro-
bust First Amendment jurisprudence at the time, however, his analysis
remained principally in the realm of rhetoric.  No decision since has ad-
dressed the First Amendment implications of the hot news doctrine di-
rectly.300  While a detailed discussion of the interaction between the First
recover only those profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
299. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 266 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
300. In National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., the Second Circuit refused to reach
the First Amendment issue, since it ultimately found for the defendant.  105 F.3d 841, 854
n.10 (2d Cir. 1997).  The district court in National Basketball Ass’n considered and rejected
the First Amendment claim.  See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking
Sys., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1124, 1138–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting defendant’s claim that
“First Amendment . . . prohibits this Court from enjoining their dissemination of real-time
information about the NBA because such an injunction would constitute an
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\111-3\COL301.txt unknown Seq: 72 23-MAR-11 11:27
490 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 111:419
Amendment and the common law is beyond the scope of this Article, this
section illustrates how rooting hot news misappropriation in a theory of
competitive unjust enrichment is likely to go some distance in rendering
it compatible with the free speech protections of the First Amendment.
On the face of things, the misappropriation doctrine raises at least three
potential First Amendment issues.
First, the hot news doctrine deals with speech that is inherently news-
worthy.301  Given that it is only time-sensitive information that qualifies
for protection, newsworthiness is in many ways central to hot news.  Yet as
a historical matter, liability for newsworthy information—information im-
bued with a public interest in its dissemination—has received very close
scrutiny under the First Amendment.302  This is especially so when such
information is truthful in nature, and lawfully obtained.303  In these in-
stances, the Supreme Court has continued to require that the restriction
serve a substantial purpose of the highest order for it to pass muster
under the First Amendment.304  While it remains unclear whether this
implies that courts need to be applying strict scrutiny in such cases (as
opposed to the more deferential intermediate scrutiny), at the very least
it demands a cogent identification of the law’s purpose, and the extent to
unconstitutional prior restraint”), aff’d in part and vacated in part sub nom. Nat’l Basketball
Ass’n, 105 F.3d 841.
301. Speech is taken to be newsworthy as a category when it deals with material that is
of a “public concern.”  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
302. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574 (1977)
(citing cases emphasizing “protection extended to the press by the First Amendment in
defamation cases”); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998)
(“[N]ewsworthiness is . . . a constitutional defense to, or privilege against, liability for
publication of truthful information.”); Battaglieri v. Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Policy, 680
N.W.2d 915, 919 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (agreeing with defendant that “use of Battaglieri’s
name and statement [in a fundraising letter] is protected under the First Amendment
because the letter concerned a matter of legitimate public concern”).  Some
commentators are split on whether to afford the media broad First Amendment protection
from breach of privacy torts for what they publish.  Compare Anthony L. Fargo & Laurence
B. Alexander, Testing the Boundaries of the First Amendment Press Clause:  A Proposal
for Protecting the Media from Newsgathering Torts, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1093,
1141–53 (2009) (arguing for broad liability protection for the media on First Amendment
grounds), with Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News,
67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1097, 1138 (1999) (arguing against liability protection and
concluding that “strong First Amendment doctrines stand in the way of many of the most
meaningful privacy reforms”).
303. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (“[W]here a newspaper publishes
truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed,
if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.”); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (“[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order.”).
304. See cases cited supra note 303. R
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which the legal mechanism employed is best positioned to realize that
purpose.305
Second, the prior restraint rule under the First Amendment cautions
against the ready grant of future-looking injunctive relief in cases where
courts have not undertaken a substantive examination of the speech in
question.306  Prior restraints are treated by courts with extreme suspicion
under the First Amendment, since they preclude a defendant from rais-
ing a successful defense that its actions are protected against liability by
the First Amendment.307  This is especially so when the defendant is a
newspaper, since the potential chilling effects that flow from the restraint
are thought to pose additional burdens on the nature and scope of demo-
cratic dialogue.308  The rule certainly does not extend to situations where
a court has examined a defendant’s actions (i.e., speech) and found
them to fall outside the scope of the First Amendment.309  But an injunc-
tion that operates even before the defendant undertakes its act of publi-
305. This distinction turns on whether the free speech burden is content based or
content neutral.  Content-based regulation generally differentiates between speech on the
basis of its message or viewpoint, whereas content-neutral burdens implicate free speech
interests incidentally, and do so independent of any underlying viewpoint or perspective.
Within the intellectual property context, scholars continue to disagree on whether the
law’s effects on speech are content based or content neutral.  Compare C. Edwin Baker,
First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891, 922–33 (2002) (arguing that
copyright is content based), with Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the
First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 47–54 (2001) (arguing that it is content
neutral).
306. For an overview of the prior restraint rule, see generally Stephen R. Barnett, The
Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 539 (1977); Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Probs. 648 (1955); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking
Prior Restraint, 92 Yale L.J. 409 (1983); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First
Amendment Process:  Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the
Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 245 (1982); Martin H. Redish, The Proper
Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 Va. L. Rev. 53 (1984).
307. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 66–67 (1989)
(condemning seizure of “obscene” materials under Indiana’s RICO law and emphasizing
that “State cannot escape the constitutional safeguards of our prior [First Amendment]
cases by merely recategorizing a pattern of obscenity violations as ‘racketeering’”); Vance
v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316–17 (1980) (“[P]rior restraints would be
more onerous and more objectionable than the threat of criminal sanctions after a film
has been exhibited, since nonobscenity would be a defense to any criminal prosecution.”).
308. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (noting “damage can be
particularly great when the prior restraint falls upon the communication of news and
commentary on current events”).
309. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 390 (1973) (noting prior restraint doctrine requires suppression of speech before
determining whether it is unprotected, but holding order in question is acceptable
because it will not go into effect until after final determination that actions were
unprotected); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 169–72 (1998) (indicating permanent
injunctions issued after speech is determined to be unprotected are not constitutionally
problematic).
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cation—where the content of such publication remains uncertain—is
thought to implicate the prior restraint rule.
Injunctive awards in misappropriation cases combine both backward-
and forward-looking elements.  On the one hand, they enjoin a defen-
dant’s actions based on past activities that are actually scrutinized by a
court.  This tracks the usual practice of courts in traditional intellectual
property cases.310  At the same time, however, hot news injunctions also
enjoin a defendant’s future publication (albeit of a similar nature) with-
out the court undertaking a substantive examination of the speech di-
rectly, by focusing instead on an abstract statement of the law that would
render the defendant potentially liable.  In the obscenity context, some
refer to these injunctions as standards injunctions, since they enjoin be-
havior based entirely on an abstract standard, rather than any concrete,
actual behavior.311  The injunction in International News is illustrative—
the court enjoined the defendant from “any taking or gainfully using of
the complainant’s news, either bodily or in substance, from bulletins is-
sued by the complainant or any of its members, or from editions of their
newspapers, until its commercial value as news to the complainant and all
of its members has passed away.”312  While this applied to news already
published by the defendant, it clearly also extended to news yet to be
collected, published, and taken, thereby likely implicating the prior re-
straint rule.
Third, in contrast to other forms of intellectual property rights, the
misappropriation doctrine—in its current propertarian version—con-
tains no internal device that allows free speech interests to be balanced
against the control they afford plaintiffs.  In copyright law, the fair use
doctrine and idea/expression dichotomy are thought to perform this
function, and other regimes contain similar mechanisms, often referred
to as First Amendment safety valves.313  Some have thus argued that the
310. One sees this, for instance, in copyright cases involving a defendant’s continued
copying and dissemination of a plaintiff’s (particular) protected work.  See Tiffany D.
Trunko, Note, Remedies for Copyright Infringement:  Respecting the First Amendment,
89 Colum. L. Rev. 1940, 1943–44 (1989) (explaining copyright plaintiff can receive
permanent injunction against future infringement after “show[ing] past acts of
infringement and a substantial likelihood of further infringement”).
311. See Doug Rendleman, Civilizing Pornography:  The Case for an Exclusive
Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 509, 555 (1977) (referring to injunctions
against dissemination of obscenity as “standards orders”); Steven T. Catlett, Note,
Enjoining Obscenity as a Public Nuisance and the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 84 Colum. L.
Rev. 1616, 1619 (1984) (referring to injunction against any future dissemination of
obscene materials as “blanket or ‘standards’ injunction”).
312. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245 (1918) (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
313. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 63 (2008) [hereinafter
Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox] (“[C]ourts consistently hold that fair use provides a free
speech safety valve within copyright law that obviates any need for external, First
Amendment constraint on copyright holders’ entitlements.”).  For a recent elaboration by
the Court on the importance of these safety valves in copyright law, see Eldred v. Ashcroft,
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absence of such safety valves in the misappropriation context renders mis-
appropriation additionally problematic under the First Amendment, at
least facially.314
Each of these problems may be overcome to some extent by situating
hot news misappropriation in a theory of competitive unjust enrichment
rather than property rights, a distinction that, as I have shown, is purpo-
sive, structural, and functional.  To begin with, it would jettison the com-
mon myth that the misappropriation doctrine attempts to create just an-
other form of intellectual property, premised on granting actors
incentives to collect and disseminate public domain information.  While
the rhetoric surrounding the doctrine today mistakenly portrays misap-
propriation precisely along these lines, even Justice Pitney explicitly re-
jected this idea when originally formulating the doctrine.315  Misappro-
priation’s purpose and thus the interest behind its creation must instead
be found in the actual newsgathering practices of newspapers, and the
collective action problem that participants face when they are dealing
with an undifferentiated common property resource in that setting.  The
multiple references to this problem in International News point to its being
the core concern that motivated the creation of the doctrine.316  Indeed
the identification of the collective action problem inherent in the news-
paper industry was hardly unique to the Court.  Since then, the federal
government has come to provide newspapers with numerous other im-
portant subsidies and immunities when they are engaged in the practice
of cooperative newsgathering.317  Cooperation as a solution to the prob-
537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stating “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment
accommodations,” such as the distinction between ideas and expression and the defense of
fair use).
314. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Citizen Media Law Project et al. in Support of
Neither Party at 18, Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., No. 10-1372 (2d Cir.
June 21, 2010) (arguing that “[h]ot news misappropriation, if it is allowed to survive, must
incorporate the same First Amendment safeguards as other forms of intellectual property
and ‘quasi-intellectual property’”).
315. International News, 248 U.S. at 234 (“It is not to be supposed that the framers of
the Constitution, when they empowered Congress [under the Intellectual Property Clause
of the Constitution], intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to
report a historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.”).
316. Id. at 231 (pointing out cost of gathering and promptly distributing news, and
necessity of cooperation with other competitors).  For references to this problem in the
lower courts’ opinions, see Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 245 (2d Cir.
1917) (“[T]he very great expense of such acquisition and transmission of information is
borne by ratable levy or assessment upon its ‘members.’”); Associated Press v. Int’l News
Serv., 240 F. 983, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (“[I]t is hardly necessary to say that no modern daily
newspaper can afford to be without the facilities offered by a well-equipped news agency.”).
317. These include the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970 and other similar
antitrust immunities.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006) (declaring it “to be the public
policy of the United States to preserve the publication of newspapers . . . where a joint
operating arrangement has been . . . entered into because of economic distress”).  For an
elaborate discussion of the background to this Act, see generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-1193
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.S.C.A.N. 3547; S. Rep. No. 91-535 (1969).  For additional
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lem is thus recognized to be of central importance to the survival and
profitability of the newspaper industry.  Accepting this purpose as the pri-
mary reason for the doctrine is thus likely to render misappropriation’s
speech burden content neutral rather than content based, given its focus
on preserving competition within the specific industry.318
This leads us to the second part of the competitive unjust enrich-
ment framework:  the liability framework.  Here, the unjust enrichment
rationale allows a plaintiff to recover without creating an abstract ex ante
entitlement in the material collected.  By focusing instead on the compet-
itive relationship between the parties, it consciously avoids attaching an
exclusionary framework to the content of the speech.  One might thus
argue that in so doing, its burden on free speech is narrowly tailored and
indeed no greater than necessary to achieve its purpose.  A property-
based approach, which would by contrast focus on creating a market for
the information collected by attaching an exclusionary entitlement di-
rectly to it, independent of the parties and their relationship, is likely to
be far more restrictive in this regard.
Moving misappropriation’s remedial framework toward one of resti-
tutionary damages is also likely to avoid any significant conflict with the
First Amendment’s restriction on prior restraints.  Instead of censoring
the publication of truthful, newsworthy material, the regime would now
do no more than enable a plaintiff to insist that the defendant disgorge
its cost savings, and compete on an equitable basis.  While this would cer-
tainly place a price on a defendant’s speech within a specific setting (al-
beit commercial speech), it certainly would not curtail the production of
such speech altogether.319
Lastly, relying on unjust enrichment instead of property as the basis
for the misappropriation doctrine obviates the need for an independent
safety valve along the lines seen in traditional intellectual property re-
gimes.  Since traditional intellectual property regimes are premised on an
analogy to real property rights, they operate by attaching an exclusionary
entitlement to a fictional, yet identifiable res (e.g., the original expres-
sion, or an individual’s persona).  Consequently, from a free speech point
options being considered in this vein, see Randall Mikkelsen, U.S. Law Chief Open to
Antitrust Aid for Newspapers, Reuters.com (Mar. 18, 2009, 5:49 PM EDT), at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1835208520090318 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s comments regarding his
commitment to modify antitrust laws if necessary to maintain U.S. print newspaper
industry).
318. Such a purpose is likely to track the Court’s opinion in Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, where it found the FCC’s must-carry rules to be content-neutral free speech
regulation, since they were directed at preventing “unfair competition” in the
communications industry, and their speech effects were incidental.  See 512 U.S. 622, 652
(1994) (“[T]he must-carry provisions are not designed to favor or disadvantage speech of
any particular content.”).
319. See Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox, supra note 313, at 116 (noting that free R
speech does not necessarily mean costless speech).
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of view, it becomes necessary to ensure that the entitlement covers no
more than is absolutely necessary to further the purpose of the regime.
Thus a device like fair use or the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright
law ensures that the right attaches merely to original expression when
used by a defendant in a manner that impacts a creator’s market.  The
necessity for the safety valve then derives from the unique exclusion-
based property strategy that the regime employs.320  Since it creates an ex
ante entitlement in the abstract, balancing it with an ex ante carve-out
becomes essential.  With an unjust enrichment framework, however, the
very existence of the legal entitlement is determined ex post, relationally,
and upon a consideration of multiple factors.  Since the entitlement is
never determined in the abstract, an equally abstract safety valve becomes
less essential.  Thus, relationally determined variables such as direct com-
petition, free riding, and an examination of the systemic incentive effects
of the defendant’s actions allow courts to modulate and balance the enti-
tlement against free speech and other concerns.
To be sure, the competitive unjust enrichment framework is unlikely
to affirmatively shield hot news misappropriation from the reach of the
First Amendment, and the conclusions offered here ought to be consid-
ered tentative, especially since no court has to date weighed in on the
issue.  Yet, comparatively speaking, an unjust enrichment framework is
almost certainly more compatible with free speech interests than a prop-
erty-based framework that simulates an exclusionary or monopoly interest
in the news, however narrowly tailored in time or coverage.
CONCLUSION
Speaking of the hot news misappropriation doctrine and its origins
in International News, Judge Learned Hand observed that despite the com-
mon law’s attempt to speak in generalities, at times “there are cases where
the occasion is at once the justification for, and the limit of, what is de-
cided.”321  An otherwise outspoken champion of the common law
method of rule development, his unwillingness to extend and apply the
misappropriation doctrine to new situations has formed the subject of
some criticism.322  On closer analysis, though, there may have indeed
been a good reason for his attempt to limit misappropriation to its origins
320. See Smith, Two Strategies, supra note 52, at S464–78 (discussing costs associated R
with exclusion and governance regimes).  For an application of this difference to
intangibles, see Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 258, at 1817–19. R
321. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).  What is often
ignored is that Judge Learned Hand remained willing to extend the doctrine and apply it
to situations that were “substantially similar” to International News, in explicit recognition of
the doctrine’s structural constraints.  Id.
322. See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1036
(3d Cir. 1984) (noting conflicting cases); Baird, Common Law, supra note 47, at 419 R
(discussing Judge Hand’s reasoning).
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in the newspaper industry; for it is only upon so doing that its theoretical
and structural bases become abundantly clear.
As the hot news doctrine came to be detached from the newspaper
industry and extended to new contexts, the reasons behind its creation—
many of which are embodied in its unique requirements—came to be
lost.  Coupled with the general decline of interest in the idea of unjust
enrichment that occurred in the intervening period,323 the Court’s at-
tempt to avoid creating a property right in the news by instead develop-
ing a framework of competitive unjust enrichment has continued to re-
ceive little serious attention.  And yet, the doctrine continues to thrive
and is among the solutions thought likely to solve the revenue problems
of the newspaper industry.
Ironic as it may seem in light of common misconceptions about the
doctrine, hot news misappropriation was developed as an attempt to
avoid creating an exclusionary interest in factual news.  It was aimed in-
stead at preserving the common property nature of such news, while al-
lowing industry participants to compete on equitable terms in drawing
economic value from it.  Recognizing that the maintenance and sharing
of this common property resource required sustaining the self-organized
cooperative framework that newspapers had developed, hot news misap-
propriation sought to raise the costs of free riding through a private law-
based liability regime.  At the same time, it recognized that a regime re-
sembling the functioning of a property-based one might have the effect
of distorting the existing cooperative structures that existed at the time.
It sought to rely, therefore, on the idea of unjust enrichment, which al-
lowed a plaintiff to nullify a defendant’s unfair competitive advantage
without having to recognize an interest vested in the plaintiff until the
defendant actually obtained such an advantage.  Justice Pitney’s little un-
derstood idea of quasi-property was thus more than a mere trope, and of
deep practical significance.
The maintenance and upkeep of a common pool resource has long
been recognized to present a collective action problem among users of
that resource.  Typical attempts to solve the problem look to either gov-
ernment regulation for coercion, or private ownership to force any exter-
nalities to be fully internalized by a user.324  In her pioneering work in
this area, Ostrom added to those solutions by showing how homogeneous
communities often solved collective action problems through mecha-
323. See James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century:  Some
Unfinished Business, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1815, 1870 (2000) (“[A] sustained effort to
systematize the . . . law of restitution has begun only in the last few decades.”); Chaim
Saman, Restitution in America:  Why the U.S. Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party,
28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 99, 102 (2008) (“The idea, that restitution is its own body of law
with policies and principles distinct from contract and tort, has not maintained its vitality
in American jurisprudence.”).
324. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244–46
(1968) (analyzing resource management strategies in light of population control and
suggesting ownership or government regulation as solutions).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\111-3\COL301.txt unknown Seq: 79 23-MAR-11 11:27
2011] ENDURING MYTH OF PROPERTY IN NEWS 497
nisms of self-governance.325  The newspaper industry’s extensive reliance
on cooperative efforts to gather the news and maintain its timeliness rep-
resents one such mechanism.  Hot news misappropriation was built
around this reality.  Creating an ownership interest in the news, the pre-
mise of arguments for a property right, might have been one way of solv-
ing the collective action problem.  Beyond the obvious social costs that
would have accompanied such an approach, though, a solution based on
private ownership would have almost certainly also upset the dynamics of
cooperation and sharing in news collection that the newspaper industry
has relied on since its very beginning.  The competitive unjust enrich-
ment model that hot news misappropriation came to be modeled on was
deeply sensitive to these concerns in more ways than one.
The common law is certainly a malleable beast, and no doubt capa-
ble of being adapted to new contexts, circumstances, and necessities.  Yet,
this adaptation must pay close attention to the logic and rationale under-
lying a particular rule, most of which is often masked by the generality
with which the rule itself comes to be framed and structured.326  It is
indeed this reality that explains Judge Hand’s reluctance to extend the
doctrine—he recognized it to be a structural solution unique to the pecu-
liarities of one industry.  To the extent that the industry continues to rely
on cooperative newsgathering efforts and the sharing of leads and tips
amongst competitors to sustain its news-collecting operations, the hot
news doctrine will continue to provide a useful legal backbone with which
to deter free riding and encourage cooperation among homogeneous in-
terests.  Should the focus move away from such cooperation, however,
and in the direction of propertizing the news to deter new business mod-
els and uses for the news, the utility of the doctrine will rather ironically
lie in serving as a useful reminder of the common law’s reasons for re-
jecting private ownership as a solution to the problem.
325. Ostrom, supra note 134, at 18–21. R
326. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 5 (1963).
